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ABSTRACT
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of ownership and control in
the m odem corporation may lead to agency conflicts between principals (shareholders
and debtholders) and agents (managers). That is, managers may not always allocate
corporate resources in ways that m aximize shareholder wealth. M anagers may also
engage in activities that reallocate wealth from debtholders to shareholders.
Recent literature in CEO com pensation provide empirical evidence that CEO
inside debt holdings may mitigate the agency conflicts between m anagers and debt
holders by aligning the interests o f mangers with those o f debt holders. Two components
o f CEO inside debt compensation: pension and deferred compensation may mitigate
agency conflicts between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007;
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Eluang, Sanchez, and Stuart,
2012). In the language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed
obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is
typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatment
as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause managers
to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu,
2011). Studies on CEO inside debt compensation are limited due to data availability.

CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 2006 fiscal year as effective for
2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that firms disclose their C EO s’
inside debt positions. In this dissertation, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt
compensation on two different corporate policies: corporate cash holdings and mergers
and acquisitions (M&A).
In the first chapter, I examine the effect CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash
holdings, as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a
sample o f EXECUCOM P firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Following prior
literature on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two
measures as proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio, which is calculated as the C EO ’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to
equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity
ratio is greater than one. Higher CEO inside debt compensation alleviates agency
conflicts between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders.
CEOs with higher inside debt may prefer to invest in cash as cash holdings are less risky
projects (Tong, 2010). Consequently, based on risk-aversion hypothesis, I posit a positive
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate cash holdings. I find a
significant and positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash
holdings. I find that the positive relation between CEO inside debt com pensation and firm
cash holdings remain significant even after controlling for the effect o f CEO equity-based
incentives on firm cash

holdings. I also find that the positive relation between CEO

inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings is mitigated by the financial constraint status
o f the firm based on the notion that CEOs o f a financially constrained firms may face

difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside debt compensation goes up since
capital is limited. I adopt instrumental variable approach to explicitly address the
endogeneity problem as CEO com pensation is endogenously determ ined by firm and
CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias corrections and
findings are robust to alternative specifications. Utilizing a modified version o f the Fama
and French (1998) valuation regression, I find that cash increases have a more positive
valuation effect for firms with low levels o f CEO inside debt relative to those w ith high
levels o f CEO inside debt.
In the second chapter I investigate the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on
post-merger firm risk using acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f 2007 to 2009. I
utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and
post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the M erton
distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the change in pre
and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model
(Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk m easured as post-m erger minus pre-merger
stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in idiosyncratic risk m easured
as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model. Following prior literature on CEO inside
debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and CEO to
firm debt/equity ratio>l, a dummy variable that equals to one when the CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio is greater than one, to proxy for CEO inside debt compensation. Prior
literature on CEO inside debt finds that CEO inside debt com pensation m otivates CEOs
to engage in less risky investment and financial decisions. For example, Cassell, Huang,

Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated with
less risky investment and financial policies. Based on empirical findings o f prior
literature, I conjecture a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and post
merger firm risk. I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as
measured by change in total firm risk, measured as post-merger minus pre-m erger stock
return standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as
post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured
by the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I adopt instrumental variable approach to address
the endogeneity problem as CEO compensation is endogenously determ ined by firm and
CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias corrections.
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CHAPTER 1

CEO INSIDE DEBT CORPORATE
CASH HOLDINGS
Introduction
Agency theory (Jensen and M eckling, 1976) posits that agency conflicts between
principals (shareholders and debtholders) and agent (managers) exist in modern
corporations as the goals and desires o f agents may not be consistent with those o f
principals. M anagers, as a result, may not always use the firm ’s capital in a m anner that
maximizes shareholder’s wealth and mangers m ay engage in activities that reallocate
wealth from debtholders to shareholders. Theoretically, managerial

equity-based

compensation aligns m anager’s interest with those o f shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Several studies examine the managerial incentive effects o f equity-based
compensation and provide empirical evidence on whether managerial stock and stock
option ownership impact firm performance and particular corporate decisions and
policies.1 Nevertheless, excessive equity-based com pensation may motivate m anagers to
take more risk than debtholders prefer.
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, m ay mitigate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu,
2011;

Wei and

Yermack,

2011;

Cassell, Huang,

Sanchez, and

1 S ee for ex a m p le, C o re, G uay, and Larcker (2 0 0 3 ) for a r e v ie w o f literature.

1

Stuart,

2012).

2
In the language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed
obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is
typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatm ent
as outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEO s to
manage their firms more conservatively (Jensen and M eckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu,
2 0 1 1 ).

Corporate liquidity policy seems an ideal area to explore the link between CEO
compensation incentives and shareholder-debtholder conflicts. Excessive equity-based
compensation may motivate mangers to hold smaller cash balances than debtholders
desire. Inside debt compensation may motivate managers to manage firms conservatively
by holding higher cash balances. I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt on corporate
cash holdings in this paper.
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders occur w hen m anagers do
not allocate corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. For example,
a

primary

agency

conflict

between

managers

and

shareholders

involves

the

overinvestment o f free cash flows - managers may choose to invest in negative net
present value projects. Prior literature in executive compensation suggests that equitybased compensation acts as a vehicle to resolve the conflicts o f interests between
managers and shareholders. For example, prior studies suggest that stock and stock
options encourage risk-averse CEOs to manage their firms in ways that benefit
shareholders (Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009).

3
Agency conflicts between managers (or managers acting for shareholders) and
debt holders occur when managers increase firm risk in ways that benefit shareholders at
the expense o f debt holders. Debt holders and shareholders have different payoff
structures - debt holders are fixed claimants to firm assets while shareholders are residual
claimants. Once debt is issued, shareholders may increase the value o f their residual
claims at the expense o f debt holders. For instance, shareholders may increase the risk o f
the firm by changing investment or financial policies (asset substitution or risk shifting)
in ways that reallocate wealth from debt holders, generally through some increase in the
overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and M eckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).
Similarly, lower cash holdings may increase agency conflicts between managers and
debtholders by increasing firm risk beyond what debtholders prefer.
While equity-based compensation mitigates agency conflicts between managers
and shareholders, equity-based compensation may also exacerbate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders by motivating CEOs to increase risk beyond that
which debtholders prefer. Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency
conflicts between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. For
example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO
inside debt are associated with less risky investment and financial policies. This suggests
that CEO inside debt compensation may also be associated corporate liquidity policy.
I examine the effect of CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings,
as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a sample of
EXECUCOMP firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Specifically, I test whether CEO
inside debt is positively or negatively correlated with cash holdings. H igher CEO inside

4
debt compensation alleviates agency conflicts between managers and debt holders by
aligning mangers with debt holders. For example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart
(2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated w ith less risky
investment and financial policies. CEOs with higher inside debt may prefer to invest in
cash as cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong, 2010). Therefore, based on riskaversion hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and
corporate cash holdings. Conversely, CEOs with debt-like compensation bear a lower
cost o f borrowing (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010). This provides firms with
easier access to external financing. Similarly, creditors anticipate that mangers with high
inside debt compensation will pursue less risky policies and require fewer covenants
limiting

their

investing,

financing,

and

payout

decisions

after

debt

issuance

(Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010). Thus, based on costly external
finance hypothesis (Liu and M auer, 2011), CEOs with higher inside debt m ay hold less
cash as a hedge for future financing needs.
I begin by examining the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash
holdings, measured as the ratio o f cash plus m arketable securities to net assets where net
assets is equal to total assets m inus cash plus marketable securities. The main explanatory
variable o f interest is CEO inside debt holdings. Following previous em pirical studies on
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use two measures as proxies for CEO
inside debt holdings: 1) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal
to one if the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is greater than one. Utilizing a
contemporaneous regression where cash and all independent variables including CEO
inside debt holdings are measured at time t, I find a positive relation between CEO inside

5
debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I next examine the relation between firm cash
holdings and lagged CEO inside debt holdings to mitigate the endogeneity problem and
the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings still hold.
Further, I use a two-stage regression analysis to explicitly control for the endogeneity
problem and I find that the main results o f CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash
holdings still hold. I next divide the CEO inside debt com pensation into two main
components: pension and deferred com pensation and examine the effect o f these two
components on firm cash holdings to find out the main driving channel o f the positive
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I find that the
deferred compensation is the main driving channel behind the positive relation between
CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings.
Though CEO inside debt compensation induces CEOs to hold cash, CEOs may
face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial constraint status o f the firm
is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and
firm cash holdings could depend on w hether a firm is financially constrained. CEOs o f a
financially constrained firms may face difficulty accumulating excess cash as their inside
debt compensation goes up since capital is limited. This implies that the positive relation
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt compensation may be mitigated by
financial constraint status o f the firm. To examine whether financial constraint status o f a
firm influences the relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash
holdings, I interact CEO inside debt com pensation with several variables that proxy for
the degree to which a firm is financially constrained. I find significant negative
coefficients on the interaction terms which imply the mitigating role o f financial

6
constraint status o f the firm on the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO
inside debt holdings.
Following Cassell et al. (2012), I construct the ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity o f
the value o f the C EO ’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change
in the volatility o f stock prices) to delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the C E O ’s equitybased compensation to one percent change in the stock price) to control for the effects o f
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. I
include CEO vega/delta ratio in all regressions as a control variable and find a positive
relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. M y empirical finding that firm
cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt compensation mimics the findings o f Liu
and M auer (2011) who investigate the effect o f CEO equity-based incentives on firm
cash holdings. In their study, Liu and M auer (2011) document a positive relation between
equity-based incentives as measured by the sensitivity o f equity com pensation to
volatility (vega) and firm cash holdings. I examine these separate effects by including
both CEO inside debt compensation and vega in the cash regression and find that the
positive effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings rem ains significant
even after controlling for the effect o f vega.
Finally, I examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive
(negative) valuation effect for firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (2006), I use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998)
valuation regression. I find that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for
firms with low levels o f CEO inside debt relative to those with high levels o f CEO inside
debt.

7
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on
executive compensation focus on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed
(salary and bonus) compensation, while few studies examine debt-like compensation.
This paper extends the literature which investigates the incentive effects o f various
components o f CEO wealth, particularly CEO equity holdings (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal,
and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Focusing on a different component
o f CEO compensation, inside debt, this study provides evidence o f the effect CEO inside
debt compensation on corporate cash holdings.
Second, this study contributes to a nascent literature on executive com pensation
which investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigates agency costs of
debt by strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (Anantharam an, Fang,
and Gong, 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011; Wei and
Yermack, 2011; Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; Fie, 2011) has focused on m arket-based
implications o f CEO inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f debt, fewer restrictive debt
covenants, market reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt compensation,
financial reporting quality, etc.). In contrast, this study provides direct evidence o f the
effect o f CEO inside debt on firm investment and financial policies by exam ining the
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and corporate cash holdings. I extend
Cassell et al., (2012), who look at the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm
investment and financial policies, by investigating the effect of CEO inside debt on

8
corporate cash holdings. Further, I extend Liu, M auer, and Zhang (2012), who look at
the effect o f CEO inside debt on the marginal value o f cash to shareholders, by utilizing a
valuation regression, a total firm value approach which yields a net value o f cash that
combines the assessments o f both shareholders and debtholders.
Finally, this study adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by docum enting
the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings. Prior literature
documents several motives for firms to hold cash3: the transaction motive, the
precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency motive. The literature on corporate
cash holdings empirically examines agency theory by viewing cash holdings as a source
o f financing. My study contributes to the agency motive view of corporate cash holdings
literature by focusing on the investment perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring
the link between CEO inside debt and corporate cash-holdings.
I organize the remainder o f this paper as follows. I discuss my research, review
the literature, and develop the hypotheses; then com es an overview o f sample selection
and variables used in this study, methodology, and a description o f my sample. The
empirical results and conclusion complete the first essay.

Literature Review
Corporate Cash Holdings and Agency Costs
Corporate liquidity policy is regarded as one o f the firm ’s m ost important
decisions. This is especially true as prior studies docum ent that US firms hold a large

2 C asseil et al. (2 0 1 2 ) find a p o sitiv e relation b etw een C E O in sid e d eb t and a sset liq u id ity , m easured by
w ork in g capital. In m y sa m p le for this study, the co rrelation b e tw e en w orking cap ital and firm cash
h old in g s is not sign ifican t.
3 S ee B ates, K ahle, and S tu lz, 2 0 0 9 for d etails about w h y firm s hold cash .
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portion o f their assets in the form o f cash. For example, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009)
find that the average cash-to-assets ratio more than doubles from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2%
in 2006. Based on Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), there are four main m otives for firms
to hold cash: the transaction motive (Baumol, 1952; M iller and Orr, 1966; M ulligan,
1977)4; the precautionary motive (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and W illiamson, 1999)5; the
tax motive (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007)6; and the agency motive (Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Dittmar, and M ahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
W illiamson, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and M axwell, 2008).
This study focuses primarily on the agency m otive o f cash holdings. Prior
literature focuses on whether the agency theory explains the level o f corporate cash
holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar, M ahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Dittmar, MahrtSmith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006), and whether corporate cash
holdings affect firm value through the agency problem (Harford, 1999). While Opler et
al. (1999) do not find support for the agency motive using managerial ownership as the
combined measure for the free cash flow hypothesis and risk-reduction hypothesis, other
researchers find support. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that corporate cash holdings in
different countries are affected by the degree o f shareholder protection from law and
firms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems. Consistent with free
cash flow hypothesis, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich firms are more likely to make
4 Transaction m o tiv e fo c u ses on the need to co n serv e on the c o st o f co n v ertin g n o n -fin a n cia l a ssets into
cash and p o sits that firm s that are m ore lik ely to incur h igh er tran saction costs are e x p e c te d to m aintain
high er cash b alan ces.
5 T h e precautionary m o tiv e p osits that firm s hold cash to m eet the n eed s o f the firm s w h en it fa ces
unanticipated c o n tin g e n c ie s and w hen a c c e ss to capital m arkets is co stly .
6 T he tax m o tiv e predicts that U S firm s that w o u ld incur tax c o n se q u e n c e s related w ith repatriating foreign
earnings hold higher cash balances.
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value-decreasing acquisitions. Dittmar, M ahrt-Sm ith (2007) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (2006) find that cash is worth less when agency problems between insiders
and outside shareholders are greater. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that
entrenched managers are more likely to build excess cash balances but spend excess cash
quickly.
The agency theory explanation for cash holdings includes both the free-cash flow
hypothesis and risk-reduction hypothesis. A ccording to the free-cash flow hypothesis,
cash is viewed as a source o f financing available to the manager who serves his own
interest at the cost o f shareholders’ wealth (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). Risk-reduction
is a typical agency problem originating from different risk preferences between managers
and shareholders. The risk-reduction hypothesis posits that cash holdings are risk-free
investments and so, a risk-averse and self-interested m anager allocates higher corporate
cash holdings to reduce firm risk. For instance, A m ihud and Lev (1981) argue that a riskaverse manager may select lower NPV but less risky investment projects, which can
reduce firm value.
As noted above, previous studies on corporate cash holdings prim arily focus on
the free-cash flow hypothesis. However, there are limited studies which explore the riskreduction hypothesis in the context o f corporate cash holdings. Consistent with riskrelated agency theory, Tong (2010) finds that firms with higher CEO risk incentives have
less cash holdings using a sample o f 1,768 firms from 1993 to 2000. Conversely, Liu and
Mauer (2011) find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and
cash holdings utilizing a sample o f EXECUCOM P firms from 1992 to 2006. Liu and
Mauer (2011) measure the marginal value o f cash to shareholders and find that high CEO
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vega is associated with a lower value o f cash. This empirical evidence is also consistent
with the costly contracting hypothesis, which posits that debtholders expect greater risktaking in high vega firms and so, require greater liquidity.
Inside Debt Compensation as a M eans to
Reduce Agency Costs o f Debt
Many CEOs in the US hold significant am ounts o f pay in the form o f defined
benefit pension plans and deferred compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei
and Yermack, 2011). These forms o f executive com pensation are defined as inside debt
(in the language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976)) as this compensation represents fixed
obligation for the firm to make future payments to corporate insiders. Inside debt
compensation are unsecured and unfunded, exposing CEOs to the same default risks and
insolvency treatment as outside creditors. Therefore, CEO inside debt com pensation can
be used as a vehicle to mitigate the agency costs o f debt (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007;
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011; Cassell et al.,
2012 ).

Agency costs o f debt occur when managers vary the firm’s investm ent policy,
payout policy, or capital structure in ways that reallocate wealth from debtholders to
stockholders, generally through some increase in the overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). To alleviate the agency costs o f debt,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) recommend implementing an optimal incentive structure
under which the C E O ’s personal holdings o f the firm ’s debt and equity ratio is sim ilar to
the firm’s overall capital structure. Based on agency theory, studies on CEO inside debt
compensation find that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings prefer less risky
investment and financial policies (Cassell et al., 2012). Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
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find that as the value o f a C EO ’s pension increases relative to the value o f her equity
holdings, risk taking, as measured by distance-to-default declines. Wei and Yermack
(2

0 1 1

) examine stockholder and bondholder reactions to firms’ initial reports o f their

CEO s’ inside debt positions in early 2007 when new SEC disclosure rules took effect.
The authors find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility o f both
securities drops upon disclosures by firms where the CEO has a sizeable defined benefit
pension or deferred compensation. This suggests that inside debt may reduce firm risk
and transfer wealth from equity toward debt. This is also consistent with the idea that
investors anticipate less risk taking by managers w ith higher levels o f inside debt.
Several recent studies also find a negative relation between CEO inside debt
holdings and the cost o f debt (Anantharam an et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010;
Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011). W hen compensation packages o f CEOs consist o f both inside
debt compensation and equity-based compensation, CEO incentives vary with the relative
importance o f debt versus equity based compensation in the pay structure (inside leverage
o f the CEO). The higher a C EO ’s inside leverage relative to firm leverage (the C EO s’
relative leverage), the more closely the C EO ’s incentives are aligned with debtholders
vis-a-vis shareholders and the lesser the degree to which CEO engages in risk-seeking
behavior to damage debt holders wealth (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Anantharaman et al.
(2010) argue that if debtholders realize the incentive effects o f CEO inside debt holdings,
firms providing CEOs with higher relative leverage should bear a lower borrowing cost
and fewer covenants. Utilizing a sample o f private loans originated during 2006-2008,
they find that higher CEO relative leverage is associated with lower cost o f debt
financing and fewer restrictive covenants. Wang et al. (2011) posit that banks demand
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lower yield spreads and less strict terms on loans to firms where CEOs have large inside
debt holdings.
Using a sample o f 1,280 loan facilities for 676 unique firms originated for the
period o f 2007 to 2010, they find that banks charge lower yield spreads on loans when
CEOs o f those firms hold larger inside debt holdings. Empirical evidence also shows that
loans to firms providing CEOs with larger inside debt holdings are associated with fewer
covenant restrictions. This is consistent with the view that debtholders anticipate lower
expropriation risk by firms with larger CEO inside debt holdings. For instance, Chen,
Dou, and W ang (2010) find that public debtholders charge lower interest rates to firms
providing CEOs with more inside debt. In addition, they find that the level o f CEO inside
debt holdings exhibits a negative relation with restrictive debt covenants. In summary,
these studies suggest that CEOs with higher inside debt compensation are associated with
lower borrowing costs o f debt financing and fewer restrictive covenants.
Hypothesis Development
CEO inside debt compensation mitigates agency costs o f debt by aligning
interests o f CEOs with those o f debtholders. Prior studies find that the firms whose CEOs
are paid with inside debt holdings manage firms more conservatively as inside debt
reduces CEO s’ excessive risk-taking incentives. Since investment in cash lowers overall
firm risk, an increase in CEO inside debt should increase cash holdings. This indicates a
positive relation between CEO inside debt and the cash holdings o f a firm.
H,: Cash holdings increase in CEO inside debt holdings.
Conversely, firms that encourage

less risk-taking with high

inside debt

compensation may find it easier to raise external capital. Debtholders recognize the
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incentive effects o f CEO inside debt holdings. Therefore, firms providing their CEOs
with debt-like compensation bear a lower cost o f borrowing. Hence, firms have better
access to external financing market when CEO pay packages consist o f a substantial
amount o f inside debt holdings. Debtholders also recognize the incentive effects o f CEO
inside debt holdings. Firms providing their CEOs with debt-like com pensation bear fewer
covenants limiting their investing, financing, and payout decisions after debt issuance.
All these indicate a negative relation between CEO inside debt and cash holdings o f a
firm.
H2: Cash holdings decrease in CEO inside debt holdings.

Sample Selection and Data
Sample Selection
Data for this study comes from the followings sources: CEO com pensation data
from

EXECUCOMP; corporate

cash holdings

and other accounting

data

from

COMPUSTAT; stock price data from Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP),
governance variables from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required all firms to expand
executive compensation disclosure effective in 2006 fiscal year end. Therefore, 2006
marks the beginning o f my sample period because this is the first year that
EXECUCOMP reports CEO pension and deferred com pensation information.
I use the Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOM P database to create an initial sample
o f US firms from 2006 fiscal year to 2008 fiscal year. EXECUCOM P includes annual
compensation data from proxy statements for the five highest paid executives for firms in
the S&P 500, the S&P M idCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. Following previous
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literature, I exclude all financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) as liquidity is hard to
access in these firms. I also exclude all utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) due to their
unique regulatory environment. I then match this sample w ith COM PUSTAT, CRSP, and
IRRC for accounting data, stock return data, and governance data respectively.
The initial sample o f EXECUCOM P is matched with CO M PUSTA T Annual
Industrial file and Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) databases from 2006
to 2008. I exclude all financial and utility firms (SIC code o f 4900-4949 and 6000-6999),
all leverage buyouts (LBO) firms (stock code four in CRSP), and all firms that
incorporate abroad (incorporation code 99 in Compustat). I further limit my sample to
ordinary common shares (share code 10 or 11 in CRSP). This excludes certificates,
Americus trust components, closed-end funds, ADRs, shares o f beneficial interest, units,
and REITs from analysis. I delete any observations with missing values on CEO pension,
deferred compensation, and CEO stock incentives. A fter deleting observations with
missing values for these variables, I have a final m atched sample o f 1,859 firm-year
observations from 2006 to 2008. My sample is comparable with recent studies on CEO
inside debt holdings using the EXECUCOM P database over the period 2006 to 2008
(Cassell et al., 2012; Cen, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011). I then match this final sample with
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for governance variables and sub
sample is smaller due to the data availability from IRRC.
My final sample does not include 453 firms which have zero debt or missing debt.
This may raise a question if CEO inside debt compensation does not m atter for all-equity
firms. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that the incentive impact o f debt and equity
holdings o f CEOs depends on the capital structure o f the firm. When a firm has debt and
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equity in its capital structure, then the CEO tends to shift risk from shareholders to
debtholders if the CEO has only equity holdings in the firm. Compensating CEOs with
pension and deferred compensation aligns interests o f CEOs with that o f debtholders
which in turn, reduces agency costs o f debt. CEO inside debt compensation impacts on
decision-making by CEOs only when firm has debt in the capital structure. Therefore,
CEO inside debt compensation does not matter for all-equity firms as risk shifting from
shareholders to debtholders by CEOs does not happen for these firms.
Variable Descriptions
The primary variable is corporate cash holdings. The prim ary independent
variable is CEO inside debt compensation. I also include several additional control
variables that are related to both corporate cash holdings and CEO inside debt
compensation. Appendix A provides detailed definition o f the dependent and independent
variables utilized in my analysis.
Corporate Cash Holdings
The primary dependent variable for this study is corporate cash holdings o f a firm.
Following prior literature (for example, Opler et al., 1999), I m easure corporate cash
holdings as the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. I also measure corporate cash holdings
as cash and marketable securities to total assets and my results are sim ilar if I use this
alternative measure o f corporate cash holdings.
CEO Inside Debt Compensation
The primary explanatory variable is CEO inside debt holdings. Following prior
literature on CEO inside debt holdings (for example, Cassell et al., 2012), I use two
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measures for CEO inside debt holdings: 1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an
indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than
one. The first measure, the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, is calculated as the C EO ’s
debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio. The CEO’s debt/ equity ratio is
calculated as CEO inside debt holdings scaled by CEO equity holdings. CEO inside debt
holdings are calculated as the sum o f the present value o f accumulated pension benefits
and deferred compensation. CEO equity holdings are calculated as the value o f both stock
and stock options held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated by multiplying
the number o f shares held by the stock price at the firm ’s fiscal year end and the value o f
option is calculated by multiplying the total option delta (using the Black-Scholes (1973))
by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year end. Firm debt is the sum o f current and long
term debt. Firm equity is the product o f shares outstanding and the stock price at the
firm ’s fiscal year end. The second measure is an indicator variable equal to one when the
CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one (i.e. the CEO is more levered than the
firm), and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
CEO compensation incentives. I include additional control variables to proxy for
CEO compensation incentives that influence corporate cash holdings. Liu and Mauer
(2

0 1 1

) find a positive relation between vega and cash holdings but no signification

relation between delta and cash holdings. Following prior literature (for example, Guay,
1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006), I measure CEO
compensation incentives by the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega)
and the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock price (delta). Following Cassell et al. (2012), I
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construct the ratio o f the vega to delta (CEO vega/delta ratio) to control for the effects o f
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. I
adjust the CEO vega/delta ratio by multiplying it by the ratio o f total CEO equity
holdings to CEO inside debt to capture the relative im portance of the C E O ’s accumulated
equity holdings . 7
Governance variables. Following prior literature (for exam ple, Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007), I control for the impact o f corporate governance on cash holdings. I
measure the degree o f managerial entrenchment due to takeover protection using the
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (GIM INDEX) index. GIM INDEX is the num ber o f
antitakeover provisions in a firm ’s charter and the index varies from zero to 24. As the
most recent data on antitakeover amendm ents is 2006, I use the G-Index o f 2006 for my
sample firms from 2006 to 2008.
Firm-specific control variables. Following prior literature on corporate cash
holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009), I also include several
additional control variables to proxy for firm specific factors that may motivate and
influence corporate cash holdings. These control variables are motivated by the
transaction and precautionary explanations for corporate cash holdings. Firm size is
related with the transaction cost motive for cash holdings (O pler et al, 1999). Firm size is
calculated as the logarithm o f total assets. The precautionary motives suggest that firms
with better investment opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial
distress are more costly for them (Opler et al, 1999). I use market-to-book asset ratio,
computed as the book value o f net assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
7 If C EO eq u ity h o ld in g s are large (sm a ll), the e ffe c t o f the C E O v eg a /d e lta ratio is lik e ly to b e large
(sm all).

value o f equity, all divided by the book value o f net assets, to indicate investment
opportunities. Firms with higher cash flow accumulate more cash, all else equal (Bates et
al., 2009). I use Cash flow/net assets which is com puted as the ratio o f earnings after
interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f net
assets. I include NW C/net assets, computed as the net working capital-to-net assets ratio,
as net working capital consists o f assets that substitute for cash. Capital expenditures can
affect corporate cash holdings either from the tradeoff theory or from the financing
hierarchy theory (Opler et al., 1999). I measure capital expenditures as Capex/net assets
which are computed as the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets. I
include leverage as firms will use cash to reduce leverage if debt is sufficiently
constraining. Leverage is measured as sum o f long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets. Bates et al (2009) argue that firms that
pay dividends are likely to be less risky and have greater access to capital markets and so,
they tend to hold less cash. I include a dividend dummy which is a dum m y variable equal
to one in years in which a firm pays a common dividend and is zero otherwise to proxy
for dividends. I employ R&D/sales, the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to
sales, to measure growth opportunities. I use acquisition activity, the ratio o f expenditures
on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets, as Bates et al. (2009) argue that
acquisitions and capital expenditures would seem to be substitutes.
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Instruments.

Following prior literature on CEO

inside debt com pensation

(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et al., 2012), I
Q

include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings: CEO age ;
Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if the firm is facing
liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero otherwise; a
dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if the firm has favorable tax status
identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherwise; m axim um state tax
rate on individual income . 9
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. All continuous variables
are winsorized at upper and lower

1

% o f the sample distribution to address potential

problems associated with extreme observations. Panel A o f Table 1.1 reports descriptive
statistics. The mean (median) cash is 0.1467 (0.0699). I find that the m ean (median) CEO
debt/equity ratio is 0.280 (0.078). This suggests that CEO equity holdings are larger than
CEO inside debt holdings for the majority o f my sample firms. However, the average
CEO holds more than $5 million in inside debt, suggesting that inside debt holdings are
nontrivial to my sample CEOs. The CEO to firm debt/equity ratio shows a similar
distribution with mean (median) values o f 0.684 (0.296).

8 F o llo w in g C a ssell et al., 2 0 1 2 , I do not in clu d e C E O tenure as another instrum ent sin c e C E O a g e and
C E O tenure tend to be h ig h ly correlated.
9 I c o lle c t the inform ation for the state tax rates from h ttp ://w w w .n b e r.o r g /-ta x sim /sta te -r a tes/. T h ese tax
rates are calculated using T A X S 1M m o d el (F een b erg and C ou tts, 19 9 3 ).
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Table 1.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A: Summary Statistics

C ash holdings
C E O inside debt holdings ($ M illions)
C E O debt/equity ratio ($ M illions)
C E O to firm debt/equity ratio
C E O to firm debt/equity ratio >1
C E O age
C E O tenure
Firm size
D ividend dum m y
M arket-to-book ratio
C ash flow /N et assets
N W C /N et assets
C apex/N et assets
L everage
R & D /Sales
A cquisition A ctivity
G IM Index
C E O V ega/D elta ratio

N
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1848
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1859
1144
1859

S td.D ev
M ean
0.1467 0.2318
5.8810 11.9230
0.2800 0 .5520
0.6840 1.0710
0.2399 0.4271
56.088 6 .9370
8.2120 6 .7 1 7 0
7.6860 1.4520
0.5760 0 .4940
2.1970 2 .1310
0.0920 0 .1470
0.0780 0 .1980
0.0636 0.0652
0.2099 0 .1446
0.0510 0 .1030
0.0340 0 .0770
9.1200 2 .6510
0.3135 0 .3 6 5 9

P25
M edian
0.0253
0.0699
0.0350
1.4830
0.0010
0.0780
0.0050
0.2960

P75
0.1751
6.7330
0.3158
0.9560

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

52.0000
3.0000
6.6490

56.0000
6.0000
7.5820

60.0000
11.0000
8.6510

0.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.1870
0.0570
-0.0190
0.0246
0.1022

1.5930
0.0960
0.0880
0.0431
0.1978
0.0020
0.0010
9.0000
0.2098

2.2190
0.1430
0.1890
0.0771
0.2989
0.0490
0.3020

0.0000
0.0000
7.0000
0.0714

11.0000
0.4763

Panel B: Sample distribution by industry
T w o-digit SIC
Food and K indred Products
20
Paper and A llied Products
26
27
P rinting and Publishing
C hem icals & A llied Products
28
33
Prim ary M etal Industries
Industrial & C om m ercial M achinery& C o m p u ter Equip.
35
Electronic & O ther Electrical Equip. & C om ponents E xcept
C om puter Equip.
36
T ransportation Equip.
37
M easuring A nalyzing C ontrolling Inst.; Photographic M edical
38
& O ptical G oods
48
C om m unications
50
W holesale T rade- D urable G oods
58
Eating and D rinking Places
59
M iscellaneous Retail
73
B usiness Services
Industries w ith less than 2% o f sam ple representation
T otal

F requency
74
49
38
177
42
147

P ercent
3.98
2.64
2.04
9.52
2.26
7.91

137
62

7.37
3.34

136
39
58
43
45
143

7.32
2.10
3.12
2.31
2.42
7.69

669

35.99

1,859

100.00
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Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Variables include the
ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets
minus cash and marketable securities (Cash), the sum o f the present value o f accumulated
pension benefits and deferred compensation (CEO inside debt holdings), the natural log
o f one plus the ratio o f C E O ’s debt-to-equity ratio (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio), a
dummy variable that equals one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and
zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l), the ratio of CEO vega to the delta
(CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the
book value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to
the book value o f net assets (M arket-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest,
dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash
flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets (NW C/assets), the ratio of
capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the book value of net assets (Leverage), a
dummy variable that equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in
a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and development
expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value
o f net assets (Acquisition activity), the num ber o f years since the first year that the firm is
reported in Compustat (Firm age), the number o f years the executive has served as CEO
(CEO tenure), a dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is also the chairm an o f the
board (Duality), the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm’s charter as reported
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and varies from zero to
24 (GIM Index). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in Appendix A. Data
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are obtained from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, EXECUCOM P, and IRRC and consist o f 1,859
firm-year observations from 2006 to 2008. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Panel B
reports the sample distribution by industry. Panel C reports pairw ise correlation o f
primary variables. Correlations significant at 5% or better are marked with stars.
The mean (median) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> 1 is 0.2399 (0.0000) indicating
that C EO ’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than firm ’s debt-to-equity ratio for the m ajority o f
my sample firms.
Panel B o f Table 1.1 reports the industry classification (by tw o-digit SIC codes)
across my sample. My sample firms are from a broad spectrum of industries.
Panel C o f Table 1.1 reports Pearson correlations for my variables o f interest and
our primary dependent variables. Interestingly, I find a negative and significant relation
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt holdings. I find a positive but
insignificant relation between CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and firm cash holdings while
I find a negative but insignificant relation between CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l and
firm cash holdings.

M ethodology
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings
in this section. I begin by employing m ultivariate regressions of cash holdings on CEO
inside debt compensation.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Cash Holdings
To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash
holdings, I regress cash holdings on CEO inside debt compensation and controls with
controls for industry (2-digit SIC code dummies) and year (year dum m ies) fixed effect.
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Following Liu and M auer (2011), first examine the contem poraneous relation between
cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives. The M odel One test is as shown below:
CASHn = (x + /?/ (CEO inside debt compensation),, + (h (controls),, t (h £ ( 2 d ig it SIC d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + fiy Y X ye a r d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + e„
Next, following prior studies on corporate cash holdings (Harford, M ansi, and
Maxwell, 2008 and Liu and Mauer, 2011), I examine the relation betw een cash holdings
and lagged CEO compensation incentives to control for potential endogeneity o f
compensation incentives. The Model One test is as shown below:
CASHu = a + Pi * (CEO inside debt compensation),

+ fit, (controls)i t_i + fj,

X (2 - d ig it SIC d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + f)y Y,{.ysar d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + Eit
I use two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS) to control for the endogeneity o f
compensation incentives. In the first-stage, I separately regress CEO com pensation
incentives on all o f the variables along with the instruments. In the second-stage, CEO
compensation incentives are replaced by their predicted values from their respective firststage regressions.
After examining the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings, I
next examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a m ore positive valuation effect for
firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz, and W illiam son (2006), I
use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression. Prior studies
in corporate cash holdings use this valuation regression and it is a total firm value
approach which yields a net value o f cash that combines the assessm ents o f both
shareholders and debtholders.
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Empirical Results
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on firm cash holdings in
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f firm cash holdings on CEO
inside debt compensation. I then report results o f a Fama and French (1998) valuation
regression to examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive (negative)
valuation effect for firms with higher CEO to firm debt/equity ratio.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Firm Cash Floldings
I begin by examining the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on firm cash
holdings. Following Liu and M auer (2011), I first examine the contem poraneous relation
between cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives, where firm cash holdings and
all independent variables are measured at time t. Table 1.2 reports the results o f
multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. M odels One and
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first
measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. M odels Three and
Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio> 1 .

Table 1.2
Contemporaneous Regressions o f Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt H oldings

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> 1
Firm Size
Market-to-book ratio

(1)
(2)__________(3)
0.0057 *** 0.0035 ***
(3.8800)
(3.43)
0.037***
(4.80)
-0.071
***
(-13.11)
0.073
***
(13.44)

(4)

0.029 ***
(4.97)
-0.073 ***
(-8.45)
0.075 ***
(15.31)
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Table 1.2 (Continued)
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets
Capex/Net Assets
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
Acquisition Activity
GIM Index
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
1859

Adj. R 2

0.49

-0.027
(-0.37)
-0.334
(-6.18)
-0.103
(-0.87)
-0.017
(-0.48)
1.357
(11.67)
-0.014
(-1.38)
-0.319
(-6.67)
-0.004
(-1.77)
0.0013
(2.40)
YES
1144
0.51

***

***

***
*
**
YES
1859
0.50

-0.023
(-0.45)
-0.325 ***
(-5.79)
-0.115
(-0.75)
-0.023
(-0.57)
1.413 ***
(10.54)
-0.017
(-1.61)
-0.327 ***
(-6.98)
-0.005 *
(-1.83)
0.0015 **
(2.27)
YES
1144
0.52

Table 1.2 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash
holdings in contemporaneous specification where cash and all independent variables are
measured at time t. All models control for industry and year fixed effect, where industry
is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The dependent variable is
the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets
minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are
two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio of
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm
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Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets m inus the book value o f equity plus the
market value o f equity to the book value o f net assets (M arket-to-book), the ratio o f
earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book
value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets
(NW C/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets
(Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the
book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dummy variable that equals one if regular cash
dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy),
the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio o f
expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets (Acquisition activity), GIM
Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s charter as reported by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and the index varies from zero
to 24, and CEO vega/delta ratio. Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. M odels One and Two report results where
the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to
firm debt/equity ratio) while M odels Three and Four report results where the main
explanatory variable is the second m easure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and
*** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and
significant in Models One and Two. This supports H i, which predicts that cash holdings
are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an
alternative proxy for inside debt in M odels Three and Four. The estim ated coefficients on
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CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. I continue to find support for ///.
The firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
While studying the effect o f corporate governance on firm cash holdings, Harford,
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) lag their governance variables and argue that lagging helps
control for potential endogeneity o f governance. Liu and M auer (2011) report the results
o f the relation between cash holdings and lagged CEO compensation incentives. To
control for potential endogeneity o f compensation incentives, I next exam ine the effect o f
lagged CEO inside debt compensation on firm cash holdings. Table 1.3 reports the results
o f multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. M odels One
and Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first
measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. M odels Three and
Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio> 1 .

Table 1.3
Lagged Regressions o f Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt Holdings

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
0.0062 ***
(3.39)

(2 )
0.0049 ***
(2.84)

* **

CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio> 1
Firm Size
Market-to-book ratio
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets

(4)

(3)

0.047
(4.79)
-0.073 ***
(-12.58)
0.078 * * *
(9.63)
-0.057
(-1.05)
-0.461 * * *
(-8.57)

***

0.027
(3.47)
-0.076 ***
( - 1 0 .6 6 )
0.081 ***
(11.78)
-0.075
(-1.59)
-0.491 ***
(-7.42)
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Table 1.3 (Continued)
Capex/Net Assets
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
GIM Index
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
Industry and year fixed effect
N
Adj. R 2

YES
1832
0.34

-0.138
(-0.92)
-0.105
(-0.98)
1.973 ***
(7.67)
-0.023
(-1.45)
-0 .0 0 1 *
(-1.71)
0.0009 **
(1.99)
YES
1 1 1 0

0.37

-0.157
(-1.56)
-0.113
(-0.81)
1

YES
1832
0.39

9 9 5

***

(8.13)
-0.027
(-1.26)
-0.003 *
(-1.87)
0.0013 **
(2.32)
YES
1 1 1 0

0.42

Table 1.3 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash
holdings in lagged specification where cash is measured at time t+1 and all independent
variables are measured at time t. All models control for industry and year fixed effect,
where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The
dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net
assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The two main
independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l). Control
variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural
logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the
book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the book value o f net assets
(Market-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
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depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net
working capital to net assets (NW C/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dum m y variable that
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to sales
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and
the index varies from zero to 24, and CEO vega/delta ratio. Detailed definitions o f all
variables are reported in Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. M odels One and
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first m easure o f CEO inside
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while M odels Three and Four report results
where the m ain explanatory variable is the second m easure o f CEO inside debt holdings
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /'-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and
significant in Models One and Two. This supports ///, which predicts that cash holdings
are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an
alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on
CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. I continue to find support for ///.
The firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
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Effect o f Pension and Deferred Compensation on
Firm Cash Holdings
Next, I examine which component o f CEO inside debt compensation prim arily
drives the positive relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash
holdings. I partition the CEO inside debt com pensation into pension and deferred
compensation to examine the effect o f these components o f CEO

inside debt

compensation on firm cash holdings. Table 1.4 reports the results o f m ultivariate
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the pension scaled by
total compensation, measured as the sum o f CEO inside debt holdings and equity
holdings. Models Three and Four include the other component o f CEO inside debt
holdings: deferred compensation scaled by total com pensation and total com pensation is
the sum o f CEO inside debt holdings and equity holdings.

Table 1.4
The Effect o f Pension and Deferred Compensation on Firm Cash Holdings

CEO Pension

(1)
0.029
(1.17)

(2)
0.022
(1.43)

CEO Deferred Compensation
Firm Size
Market-to-book ratio
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets
Capex/Net Assets

(3)

0.068 *
(1.83)
-0.073
***
(-15.27)
0.077
***
(12.34)
-0.032
(-0.37)
-0.311
***
(-5.51)
-0.085
(-0.71)

(4)

0.061
(1.77)
-0.075
(-15.85)
0.079
(12.58)
-0.033
(-0.41)
-0.314
(-5.87)
-0.087
(-0.79)

*
***
***

***
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Table 1.4 (Continued)
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
GIM Index
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
2312

Adj. R 2

0.54

-0.019
(-0.53)
1.427 ***
(9.23)
-0.005
(-1.07)
-0.003 *
(-1.74)
0.0019 ***
(3.43)
YES
1590
0.56

YES
2312

-0 . 0 2 1
(-0.65)
1.435
(9.57)
-0.008
(-1.19)
-0.004*
(-1.87)
0.0023
(3.76)
YES
1590

0.55

0.58

Table 1.4 reports results o f the effect o f two components o f CEO inside debt
holdings: pension and deferred compensation on cash holdings. All m odels control for
industry and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fam a and French 49
industry classification. The dependent variable is the ratio of cash plus m arketable
securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable
securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are: Pension and Deferred
compensation and they are scaled by the sum o f CEO inside debt and equity holdings.
Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/D elta Ratio), the
natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus
the book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the book value o f net assets
(M arket-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net
working capital to net assets (NW C/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current
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liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dum m y variable that
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to sales
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and
the index varies from zero to 24. Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. M odels One and Two report results where
the main explanatory variable is pension while M odels Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is deferred compensation. The t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on both pension and deferred com pensation are
positive. However, the estimated coefficients on deferred com pensation are significant. In
summary, results from Table 1.4 suggest that deferred com pensation is the driving
channel behind the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt
holdings.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt and Equity Compensation
Incentives on Firm Cash Holdings
My finding that a positive relation exists between CEO inside debt holdings and
firm cash holdings mimics the findings in Liu and M auer (2011), who find a positive
relation between firm cash holdings and the vega o f a C EO ’s equity compensation.
Therefore, one can interpret that a positive relation exits between CEO debt and equity
compensation and firm cash holdings. In their paper, Liu and M auer (2011) argue that
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debtholders anticipate the risk-shifting incentives associated with vega and therefore
require high vega firms to hold greater cash holdings to protect their interests. CEO
inside debt compensation reduces agency cost o f debt by aligning the interests o f CEO
with those o f debtholders. I find a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings
and cash holdings and this may be due to the fact that inside debt reduces the CEOs risktaking incentives. In this section, I examine whether the significant positive relation CEO
inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings still remain after including vega o f a
CEO ’s equity compensation as a control variable.
Table 1.5 investigates these separate effects by including inside debt and vega in
the cash regression. Positive coefficients on inside debt and vega suggest that both
channels have a direct effect on cash balances. Model One includes the first measure o f
inside debt holdings and vega while Model Two includes the second m easure o f CEO
inside debt holdings and vega, respectively. As seen in Model One, the first m easure of
CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and vega are significantly
positively related to cash. Again in Model Two, both the second m easure o f CEO inside
debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l and vega are significantly positively
related to firm cash holdings. Overall, results in Table 1.5 confirm my main findings that
the positive effect o f inside debt on cash holdings is distinct from the effect o f vega o f a
C EO ’s equity compensation on firm cash holdings.
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Table 1.5
The Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Compensation and Vega on Firm Cash H oldings

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
0.0023 ***
(2.97)

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l
CEO Vega
Firm Size
M arket-to-book ratio
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets
Capex/Net Assets
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
Acquisition Activity
GIM Index
Industry and year fixed effect
N
Adj. R 2

0.213**
(2.49)
-0.072***
(-12.17)
0.067***
(13.63)
-0.055
(-1.23)
-0.389***
(-7.22)
-

0.111

(-1.37)
-0 . 0 1 1
(-0.67)
1.062***
(10.98)
-0.009
(-0.93)
-0.281 ***
(-6.45)
-0 . 0 0 2 *
( - 1 .8 6 )
YES
1144
0.54

(2 )

0.014***
(3.44)
0.234**
(2.31)
-0.074***
(-1 0 .1 1 )
0.071 ***
(14.92)
-0.078
(-1.58)
-0.412***
(- 6 .6 6 )
-0 . 1 2 1
(-0.98)
-0.019
(-0.78)
1 091 ***
(11.34)
-0 . 0 1 2
(-1.51)
-0.297***
(-6.76)
-0.003 *
(-1.79)
YES
1144
0.53

Table 1.5 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings and vega on
cash holdings. All models control for industry and year fixed effect, where industry is
defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The dependent variable is
the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets
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minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The three m ain independent variables are
two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio > l), the sensitivity o f the value o f the
C EO ’s accumulated equity-based com pensation to a one percent change in the volatility
o f stock prices (Vega). Control variables are the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm
Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets m inus the book value o f equity plus the
market value o f equity to the book value o f net assets (M arket-to-book), the ratio of
earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book
value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets
(NW C/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets
(Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the
book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dum m y variable that equals one if regular cash
dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy),
the ratio o f research and development expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio of
expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets (Acquisition activity), GIM
Index, the number of antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s charter as reported by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and the index varies from zero
to 24. Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in Appendix A. Sample period is
2006 - 2008. Models One and Two report results where the main explanatory variables
are the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) and
Vega while M odels Three and Four report results where the main explanatory variables
are the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l)
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and Vega. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate
levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Firm Cash Holdings
for Firms Facing Financial Constraints
CEOs may face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial
constraint status o f the firm is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between
CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings could depend on w hether a firm is
financially constrained. CEOs o f a financially constrained firms m ay face difficulty
accumulating excess cash as their inside debt compensation goes up as capital is limited.
This implies that the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt
compensation may be mitigated by financial constraint status o f the firm.
To examine whether financial constraints influence the relation betw een CEO
inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings, I interact CEO

inside debt

compensation with variables that proxy for the degree to which a firm is financially
constrained. Negative coefficients on these interaction terms indicate that the positive
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings is sm aller for
financially constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms.
Following prior literature, I construct a number o f financial constraint proxies.
Small firms are less likely than large firms to have access to external funds and based on
this argument Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) utilize firm size as a proxy for financial
constraint status o f the firm. Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) argue that firms with
large amounts o f growth options and few assets in place generate less internal funds and
they face difficulty funding their growth options with external funds. Based on this
argument Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) utilize the m arket-to-book ratio as a
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proxy for financial constraint. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) use dividend payout
to proxy for financial constraint status o f the firm as it suggests that low dividend payout
firms have insufficient internal cash flow to fund investm ents and so, these firms have to
rely on external funds.
Following Liu and M auer (2011), I use two different dummy variables for small
firm size (SMALLSALES and SMALLNA). SM ALLSALES is a dum m y variable equal
to one if a firm ’s sales in below the sample median and zero otherw ise whereas
SMALLNA is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm ’s net assets (total assets minus
cash plus marketable securities) is below the sample median and zero otherwise. I use a
dummy variable HIGHM B for high m arket-to-book ratio and HIGHM B is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm ’s market to book ratio is above the sam ple median and
zero otherwise. Finally, I use a dummy variable LOW PAYOUT to proxy for w hether a
firm has low dividend payout. LOW PAYOUT is a dummy variable equal to one if the
firm’s payout ratio is below the sample median and zero otherwise. Payout ratio o f a firm
is measured as the ratio o f common dividends plus share repurchases to earnings.
Table 1.6 reports regression results in which I interact the m easure o f CEO inside
debt: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio with two different dummy variables for small firm
size (SMALLSALES and SMALLNA) in M odels One and Two, a dummy variable for
high market-to-book (HIGHM B) in Model Three, and a dum my variable for w hether the
firm has low payouts (LOW PAYOUT) in Model Four. I exclude the continuous variable
firm size as a control in M odels One and Two as I use two proxies for size to measure
financial constraints while in Model Three, I exclude the continuous variable market-tobook as a control because I use market-to-book to proxy for financial constraint.
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Table 1.6
Regressions o f Cash Holdings on Inside Debt fo r Financially Constrained Firms

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x
SMALLSALES

(1)
0.0041
(2.97)
-0.085

* * *

(2)
(3)
(4)
0.0052 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0077 ***
(3.41)
(3.29)
(3.07)

***

(-3.11)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x
SMALLNA

-0.091 ***
(-2.68)
-0.107 ***

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x
HIGHMB

(-3.47)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio x
LOWPAYOUT

-0.063 *

Firm Size
M arket-to-book ratio
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets
Capex/Net Assets
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
Acquisition Activity
GIM Index
Industry and year fixed effect
N
Adj. R2

0.067 * * * 0.065 ***
(15.37)
(12.77)
-0.019
-0.013
(-1.35)
(-1.09)
***
-0.391 ***
-0.403
(-6.29)
(-7.56)
-0.117
-0.089
(-1.57)
(-1.31)
-0.009
-0.011
(-0.29)
(-0.78)
1.079 * * * 1.098 ***
(10.50)
(12.56)
-0.010
-0.008
(-1.04)
(-0.97)
-0.298 *** -0.301 ***
(-6.79)
(-5.78)
*
-0.003
-0.003 *
(-1.93)
(-1.67)
YES
YES
1144
1144
0.50
0.51

(-1.69)
-0.069 *** -0.070
(-10.73)
(-9.67)
0.063
(13.46)
-0.021
(-1.61)
-0.363
(-6.87)
-0.109
(-1.49)
-0.007
(-0.62)
1.103
(9.84)
-0.009
(-1.32)
-0.312
(-6.54)
-0.004
(-1.89)
YES
YES
1144
1144
0.48
0.53

***
***

***

***

***
*
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Table 1.6 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash
holdings for financially constrained firms. All models control for industry and year fixed
effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification.
The dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable securities to net assets, where
net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable securities (Cash). The main
independent variable is the measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio. In Models (1) and (2) I exclude the continuous variable firm size as a
control as I use two proxies for size to measure financial constraints and in M odel Three.
I exclude the continuous variable market-to-book as a control because I use market-tobook to proxy for financial constraint. SM ALLSALES is a dummy variable equal to one
if a firm’s sales is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. SM ALLNA is a dummy
variable equal to one if a firm ’s net assets (total assets minus cash plus marketable
securities) is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. HIGHM B is a dum m y
variable equal to one if the firm’s market-to-book ratio is above the sample median, and
zero otherwise. LOW PAYOUT is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm ’s payout
ratio is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. The payout ratio in a given year is
calculated as the ratio o f common dividends plus share repurchases to earnings before
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. Control
variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural
logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book value o f net assets minus the
book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the book value o f net assets
(M arket-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash flow/assets), the ratio o f net
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working capital to net assets (NW C/assets), the ratio o f capital expenditures to the book
value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the book value o f net assets (Leverage), a dum m y variable that
equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in a given fiscal year
(Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to sales
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value o f net assets
(Acquisition activity), GIM Index, the number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm ’s
charter as reported by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and
the index varies from zero to 24. Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Results in the Table 1.6 indicate that the coefficients on inside debt interacted
with the financial constraint proxies are all negative and significant consistent with the
predicted effect o f financial constraints. However, the coefficient on the interaction with
LOW PAYOUT is negative but not statistically significant. Interestingly, the magnitudes
o f the coefficients on the interaction terms are large enough so that they are able to offset
the positive effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on cash. In summary, findings in the
Table 1.6 indicate that financial constraint status o f a firm can entirely offset the
incentive o f CEOs with inside debt compensation to build excess cash reserves in a firm.
Endogeneity Concern
My multivariate analysis is based on OLS regression. My analysis assumes that
CEO inside debt compensation is exogenous whereas CEO inside debt compensation
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could be determined endogenously with firm cash holding policy. The possibility that
CEO inside debt compensation is endogenous gives rise to two related concerns. First,
the model specification suffers an omitted variable bias and consequently, the model does
not capture all determinants o f firm cash holding policy and there are unobserved firmspecific and CEO-specific characteristics that influence both firm cash policy and CEO
inside debt compensation. Second, the direction o f causality between CEO inside debt
compensation and firm cash policy is hard to conclude. It is possible that changes in cash
holding policy change firm value which requires the adjustment in CEO inside debt
compensation. This imply that the contem poraneous relation between CEO inside debt
compensation and firm cash holdings is subject to the concern that changes in firm cash
policy lead to changes in CEO inside debt compensation. By estimating the impact of
CEO inside debt holdings on future firm cash holdings, I attempt to control for the
potential endogeneity that exists between CEO compensation structure and firm cash
policy.
As further sensitivity tests, I estimate my models using a two-stage least-squares
framework to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. In the first stage, I separately
regress CEO inside debt holdings on all o f the independent variables along with the
instruments. The second stage then utilizes the predicted value o f CEO inside debt
holdings from the first stage. Following prior literature on CEO inside debt compensation
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et ah, 2012), I
include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings: CEO ag e10;
Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if the firm is facing
10 F o llo w in g C a ssell et al., 2 0 1 2 , 1 d o not in clu d e C E O tenure as another instrum ent sin c e C E O a g e and
C E O tenure tend to be h igh ly correlated.
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liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero otherwise; a
dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if the firm has favorable tax status
identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherwise; m axim um state tax
rate on individual income. These rates are calculated using the TAXSIM model
(Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), and were obtained from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim /staterates/.
Table 1.7 reports the second-stage regression in which CEO inside debt holding is
replaced by its predicted value from its respective first-stage regression. M odels One and
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the
predicted values o f first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio. M odels Three and Four include the predicted values o f alternative measure o f CEO
inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l. The estim ated coefficients on
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are positive and significant in Models One and Two. This
supports H i, which predicts that firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt
holdings. My conclusions remain unchanged using the predicted values o f the alternative
proxy for CEO inside debt in M odels Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on CEO
to firm debt/equity >1 are positive and significant. Overall, results from two-stage leastsquares framework suggest that the firm cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt
holdings.
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Table 1.7
2SLS Regressions o f Cash Holdings on CEO Inside Debt Holdings

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
0.067 ***
(5.54)

(2)
0.043 * * *
(4.88)

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l

(3)

0.177 ***
(6.39)

Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
1716

-0.075
(-13.89)
0.087
(11.23)
-0.017
(-0.59)
-0.351
(-5.71)
-0.083
(-0.74)
-0.029
(-0.93)
1.295
(9.13)
-0.017
(-1.44)
-0.0007
(-1.78)
0.057
(2.17)
YES
1006

Adj. R2

0.53

0.56

Firm Size
M arket-to-book ratio
Cash flow/Net Assets
NW C/Net Assets
Capex/Net Assets
Leverage
R&D/Sales
Dividend Dummy
GIM Index
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

(4)

YES
1716

0.139
(4.57)
-0.077
(-11.37)
0.089
(12.96)
-0.019
(-0.86)
-0.373
(-6.34)
-0.087
(-1.03)
-0.031
(-0.86)
1.324
(9.35)
-0.024
(-1.35)
-0.0009
(-1.82)
0.063
(2.35)
YES
1006

0.54

0.55

***
***

***

***

*
**

**
***
***

***

***

*
**

Table 1.7 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on cash
holdings in two stage least square where in the first stage CEO inside debt holdings are
regressed on all independent variables plus instruments and in the second stage cash is
regressed on the predicted values o f CEO inside debt compensation. All models control
for industry and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French
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49 industry classification. The dependent variable is the ratio o f cash plus marketable
securities to net assets, where net assets are total assets minus cash and marketable
securities (Cash). The two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO
inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value
o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherw ise (CEO to
firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO
Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the ratio o f the book
value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the market value o f equity to the
book value o f net assets (M arket-to-book), the ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends
and taxes but before depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets (Cash
flow/assets), the ratio o f net working capital to net assets (NW C/assets), the ratio of
capital expenditures to the book value o f net assets (Capex/assets), the sum o f long-term
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the book value of net assets (Leverage), a
dummy variable that equals one if regular cash dividends on common stock is positive in
a given fiscal year (Dividend payout dummy), the ratio o f research and developm ent
expense to sales (R&D/sales), the ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to the book value
o f net assets (Acquisition activity). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in
Appendix A. Sample period is 2006 - 2008. M odels One and Two report results where
the main explanatory variable is the predicted value o f the first m easure o f CEO inside
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is the predicted value o f the second m easure o f CEO
inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in
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parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
Effect o f Cash Increases (Decreases) on Valuation Effect
for Firms with Lower CEO to Firm
Debt/Equity Ratio
I now examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a m ore positive (negative)
valuation effect for firms with lower CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I em ploy the Fama
and French (1998) valuation regression. This regression has been used in many studies
examining valuation effects and is well suited for my purpose as it accounts for crosssection variations in firm value. This total firm value regression approach has been used
in many studies examining valuation effect. Pinkowitz and W illiamson (2005) use this
model to analyze the determinants o f the value o f cash for domestic firms. Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and W illiamson (2003) use this model to investigate the valuation effect o f cash
and dividends for firms in countries with different level o f investor protection. Dittmar
and M ahrt-Smith (2007) use this model to show that cash is worth less w hen agency
problems between insiders and outsiders are greater. Brockman and Unlu (2009) use this
model to test whether dividend reductions (increases) are value increasing (decreasing)
for firms in countries with poor creditor rights. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
W illiamson (2006), I use the modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation
regression by replacing the two year change in value o f variables by one year change in
value o f variables. The basic regression specification is as follows:
Vi,t = P 0 + P i E i<t+ M E i i t + p 3 d E i t + 1 + p 4 dAj t + p 5d A iit+1 + P 6 R D i t + p 7 d R D i t
+

p a d R D j t + 1 + p 9l(t + P io d f i t +

+ p 14dDj t+1 + P 1 5 Q t +

P11dlift+1 +

P 12Di i t + p 13d D j t

p 16dCj t + p 17d C j t+1 + p 18dVj t+1 + £j t

( 1 .1)

Al
In the above equation (1.1), all variables are scaled by total assets to control for
heteroskedasticity (see Pinkowitz, Stulz, and W illiamson, 2003; and Brockm an and Unlu,
2009). Xt is the level o f variable X in fiscal year t scaled by total assets in year t. dXt is
the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets in year t
((Xt - Xt_ 1) /A t). dXt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1 scaled by
total assets in year t ((Xt+1 - Xt) / A t). Firm value is m easured by the market value o f the
firm, which is calculated as the sum o f market value o f equity and total liabilities at fiscal
year end. The independent variables include earnings (E), total assets (A), research and
development expenditures (RD), interest expense (I), com m on dividends (D), cash plus
marketable securities (C), and total value o f the firm value for year t+1 (Vt+1). Earnings
are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items, plus interest expense, plus income
statement deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available). A is the book value of
total assets. RD is R&D expenditures and is set to zero when missing. I is the interest
expense. D is the cash dividends paid to common stock. V is firm’s com m on stock price
multiply shares outstanding at the end o f fiscal year, plus preferred stock, plus total book
liabilities, minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available),
where preferred stock is taken to be, in order and as available, redem ption value,
liquidating value, or par value. Notice that this model includes next-period variables to
absorb changes in expectations. The primary variable o f interest in my study is the
contemporaneous relation between firm value and cash plus marketable securities (Cj t).
This directly measures the valuation effect o f current cash plus marketable securities on
firm.
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Table 1.8 reports the results using a modified version o f the Fama and French
(1998) valuation regression model. I allow the coefficient estimates and intercept to vary
with inside debt in order to estimate how cash plus marketable securities have a different
valuation effect for firms with different levels o f inside debt. More specifically, in each
fiscal year, I create a dummy variable with a value o f one for firms with a CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio above median and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is further
interacted with all the independent variables as well as the constant. Therefore, the
coefficient estimates on the interaction term are the additional valuation effect o f cash for
firms with relative inside debt ratio above median. Cash increases should generate more
value for firms with lower relative inside debt ratio. Following Fama and French (1998), I
estimate the equation using the Fama-M acBeth (1973) methodology. M odels One and
Two do not include induce industry effects, while Model Three and Four include industry
effects.

Table 1.8
CEO Inside Debt Compensation and Cash Valuations
(2 )

(1)
L o w inside
debt

E,
dE,
dE,+/
dA,
dA t+i
RD,

4.39 ***
(5.85)
-0.69 ***
(- 8 . 1 1 )
2.63 ***
(6.19)
-0.13
(-1.15)
0.55
(1.13)
2.23

H igh in sid e
debt

5.96 ***
(7.77)
-1.23 * * *
(-8.41)
2.71 * * *
(6.73)
-0.17
(-1.39)
0.34
(1.51)
1.13

T -sta tistics o f
d ifferen ce

3.14
-0.59
0.14
-0.24
-0.51
-1 . 1 0

*

L ow in sid e
d eb t

4 89

***

H igh in sid e
d eb t

T -sta tistics
of
d ifferen ce

6.31 *** 2.04
(7.45)
(7.79)
-0 89 *** -0 49 *** -0.39
(-12.67)
(-12.48)
* * * 0.65
2.56 *** 2 7 9
(7.57)
(7.76)
-0.14
-0 . 1 0
0.03
(-0.81)
(-1.09)
0.46
0.35
-0.33
(1.45)
(1.27)
2.09
2.67
-1 .1 0
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Table 1.8 (Continued)

dRD,
dRD,+1
I,
dl,
d l,+i
Dt
dD,
d D ,n
Ct
dC,
dCt+i

dV,+i
Constant

(1.17)
-1.45
(-0.99)
3.21
(2.39)
-11.88
(-2.20)
5.65
(1.57)
1.87
(1.05)
3.57*
(1.73)
-2.49
(-1.57)
-1.47
(-1.03)
9.58
(11.19)
3.25
(1.25)
1.94*
(1.78)
-0.36
(-1.24)
1.55
(18.79)

Industry
fixed effect
N
r2

No
1756
0.51

**
**

***

***

(1.58)
0.59
(1.91)
4.57
(2.45)
-10.83
(-2.31)
2.79
(1.45)
5.03*
(1.75)
10.11
(11.35)
-3.17
(-1.09)
1.67
(1.87)
4.56
(3.68)
1.77
(1.11)
1.36
(1.16)
-0.55
(-1.49)
1.33
(14.73)

(1.17)
3.25
-1.87
(-1.43)
**
*
4.35
3.47
(2.17)
**
-12.11
1.47
(-2.41)
-0.34
7.16*
(1.86)
3.99 *
3.17
(1.46)
*** 6.57 **
3.67
(2.37)
-0.17
-2.52
(-1.59)
*
*
4.01
-1.78
(-1.35)
*** -5.18 **
9.78
(9.77)
-2.17
3.13
(1.60)
4.01 *
1.99
(1.22)
-2.46
-0.24
(-1.07)
*** -13.50 * * * 1.67
(10.57)
*

*

(1.55)
-0.65
(-1.58)
**
4.11
(2.46)
**
-9.09
(-2.28)
3.39
(1.92)
3.76
(1.49)
**
7.47
(9.56)
-2.67
(-1.22)
-3.67
(-1.46)
*** 5.52
(8.32)
1.98
(1.12)
1.78
(1.29)
-0.49
(-1.47)
*** 1.23
(9.77)

0.43
**

3.63 *

**

3.31

*

-0.39

*

0.13
* * * 3.49 *
-0.06
0.45
* * * -3.78 *
-2.06
-0.67
-2.38
* * * -3.79 *

YES
1756
0.6011

Table 1.8 presents the regression results o f cash valuation effect for firms with
different level o f CEO to firm debt/equity ratio using Fama and M acBeth (1973)
methodology. Sample period is 2006-2008. Due to data limitation on Compustat, sample
size is reduced to 1,756 firm-year observations. Model O ne does not include industry
fixed effect. Model Two includes industry fixed effect. Industry is defined based on Fama
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and French 49 industry classification. X t is the level o f variable X in fiscal year t scaled
by total assets in year t. d X t is the change in variable X from year t-l to year t scaled by
total assets in year t ((Xt -

d X t+1 is the change in variable X from year t to

year t+1 scaled by total assets in year t ((Xt+1 - Xt ) / A t ). The independent variables
include earnings (E), total assets (A), research and developm ent expenditures (RD),
interest expense (I), common dividends (D), cash plus marketable securities (C), and total
value o f the firm value for year t+1 (Ft+1). Earnings is calculated as earnings before
extraordinary items, plus interest expense, plus income statement deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (if available). A is the book value o f total assets. RD is R&D
expenditures and is set to zero when missing. I is the interest expense. D is the cash
dividends paid to common stock. V is the market value o f the firm calculated by
multiplying firm ’s common stock price by shares outstanding at the end o f fiscal year,
plus preferred stock, plus total book liabilities, minus balance sheet deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (if available), where preferred stock is taken to be, in order and as
available, redemption value, liquidating value, or par value. The /-statistics are reported
in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficient for low inside debt firms in Model One is positive and
significant (9.58). While the estimated coefficient for high inside debt firms is also
positive and significant (4.56) in Model One, the positive valuation effect is significantly
greater for low inside debt firms relative to high inside debt firms. My results are similar
in Model Two which includes firm fixed effects. Overall, my results suggest that cash
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changes have a more positive valuation effect for firms w ith lower level o f inside debt
than firms with a higher level o f inside debt.
Conclusion
In this essay, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on firm s’
cash holdings. CEO inside debt compensation mitigates the agency conflicts between
debtholders and shareholders by aligning the interests o f CEO s with those o f debtholders.
Two components o f CEO inside debt compensation: pension and deferred compensation
may mitigate agency conflicts between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and
Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang,
Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt”
represents a fixed obligation for the firm to make future payments to executives. Further,
inside debt is typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured
and unfunded nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and
insolvency treatment as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and
may cause managers to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and M eckling, 1976;
Edmans and Liu, 2011).
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside
debt are associated with less risky investment and financial policies. CEOs with higher
inside debt may prefer to invest in cash as cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong,
2010). Therefore, based on risk-aversion hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between
CEO inside debt holdings and corporate cash holdings. Conversely, CEOs with debt-like
compensation bear a lower cost o f borrowing (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010).
This provides firms with easier access to external financing. Similarly, creditors
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anticipate that mangers with high inside debt com pensation will pursue less risky policies
and require fewer covenants limiting their investing, financing, and payout decisions after
debt issuance (Anantharaman et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010). Thus, based on
costly external finance hypothesis (Liu and M auer, 2011), CEOs with higher inside debt
may hold less cash as a hedge for future financing needs.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings,
as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets where net assets is
equal to total assets minus cash plus marketable securities, using a sample o f
EXECUCOM P firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Specifically, I test w hether CEO
inside debt is positively or negatively correlated with cash holdings. The main
explanatory variable o f interest is CEO inside debt holdings. Following previous
empirical studies on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use tw o measures
as proxies for CEO inside debt holdings: 1) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an
indicator variable equal to one if the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is greater than one.
Utilizing a contemporaneous regression where cash and all independent variables
including CEO inside debt holdings are m easured at time t, I find a positive relation
between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings. I next examine the relation
between firm cash holdings and lagged CEO inside debt holdings to mitigate the
endogeneity problem and the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and
firm cash holdings still hold. Further, I use a two-stage regression analysis to explicitly
control for the endogeneity problem and I find that the m ain results o f CEO inside debt
holdings and firm cash holdings still hold. I next divide the CEO inside debt
compensation into two main components: pension and deferred com pensation and
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examine the effect o f these two components on firm cash holdings to find out the main
driving channel o f the positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash
holdings. I find that the deferred com pensation is the main driving channel behind the
positive relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm cash holdings.
Though CEO inside debt com pensation induces CEOs to hold cash, CEOs may
face constraints in their ability to hold excess cash. Financial constraint status o f the firm
is one o f the constraining factor and the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and
firm cash holdings could depend on whether a firm is financially constrained. CEOs o f a
financially constrained firms may face difficulty accum ulating excess cash as their inside
debt compensation goes up since capital is limited. This implies that the positive relation
between firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt compensation m ay be mitigated by
financial constraint status o f the firm. To examine whether financial constraint status o f a
firm influences the relation between CEO inside debt com pensation and firm cash
holdings, I interact CEO inside debt compensation with several variables that proxy for
the degree to which a firm is financially constrained. I find significant negative
coefficients on the interaction terms which imply the mitigating role o f financial
constraint status o f the firm on the positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO
inside debt holdings.
Following Cassell et al. (2012), I construct the ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity of
the value o f the CEO’s accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change
in the volatility o f stock prices) to delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the C EO ’s equitybased compensation to one percent change in the stock price) to control for the effects of
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences and corporate cash holdings. 1
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include CEO vega/delta ratio in all regressions as a control variable and find a positive
relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. My empirical finding that firm
cash holdings are increasing in CEO inside debt com pensation mimics the findings o f Liu
and M auer (2011) who investigate the effect o f CEO equity-based incentives on firm
cash holdings. In their study, Liu and M auer (2011) docum ent a positive relation between
equity-based incentives as measured by the sensitivity o f equity com pensation to
volatility (vega) and firm cash holdings. I exam ine these separate effects by including
both CEO inside debt compensation and vega in the cash regression and find that the
positive effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash holdings rem ains significant
even after controlling for the effect o f vega.
Finally, I examine whether cash increases (decreases) have a more positive
(negative) valuation effect for firms with lower CEO inside debt. Following Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and W illiamson (2006), I use a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998)
valuation regression. I find that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for
firms with low levels o f CEO inside debt relative to those w ith high levels o f CEO inside
debt.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on
executive compensation focus on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed
(salary and bonus) compensation, while few studies examine debt-like compensation.
This paper extends the literature which investigates the incentive effects o f various
components o f CEO wealth, particularly CEO equity holdings (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal,
and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Focusing on a different component
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o f CEO compensation, inside debt, this study provides evidence o f the effect CEO inside
debt compensation on corporate cash holdings.
Second, this study contributes to a nascent literature on executive com pensation
which investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigates agency costs o f
debt by strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (A nantharam an, Fang,
and Gong, 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and X in, 2011; Wei and
Yermack, 2011; Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; He, 2011) has focused on m arket-based
implications o f CEO inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f debt, few er restrictive debt
covenants, market reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt com pensation,
financial reporting quality, etc.). In contrast, this study provides direct evidence o f the
effect o f CEO inside debt on firm investment and financial policies by exam ining the
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and corporate cash holdings. Further, I
extend Cassell et al., (2012), who look at the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on firm
investment and financial policies, by investigating the effect o f CEO inside debt on
corporate cash holdings.11
Finally, this study adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by docum enting
the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings. Prior literature
documents several motives for firms to hold cash12: the transaction motive, the
precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency motive. The literature on corporate

11 C a ssell et al. (2 0 1 2 ) find a p o sitiv e relation b etw een C E O inside d eb t and a sse t liq u id ity , m easu red by
w ork in g capital. In m y sa m p le for th is stu d y, the correlation b e tw een w ork in g cap ita l and firm cash
h o ld in g s is not sign ifican t.
12 S ee B ates, K ahle, and Stulz, 2 0 0 9 for d eta ils about w h y firm s hold cash .
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cash holdings empirically examines agency theory by view ing cash holdings as a source
o f financing. My study contributes to the agency motive view of corporate cash holdings
literature by focusing on the investment perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring
the link between CEO inside debt and corporate cash-holdings.

CHAPTER 2

CEO INSIDE DEBT: IS THERE A RELATION
BETWEEN POST MERGER FIRM RISK
AND CEO INSIDE DEBT?
Introduction
The separation o f ownership and control in the m odern corporation may lead to
agency

conflicts

between principals

(shareholders

and

debtholders)

and

agents

(managers) (Jensen and M eckling, 1976). That is, managers may not always allocate
corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. M anagers may also
engage in activities that reallocate wealth from debtholders to shareholders.
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, may mitigate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edm ans and Liu,
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the
language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed obligation for
the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is typically an
unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded nature o f
inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatm ent as
outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEOs to manage
their firms conservatively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011).
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Inside debt may also influence managerial incentives to pursue diversifying
mergers (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). This paper attem pts to answ er w hether higher
CEO inside debt causes CEO to diversify firm operations and reduce firm risk by
examining the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation o f post-m erger firm risk.
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders occur when m anagers do
not allocate corporate resources in ways that maximize shareholder wealth. For example,
a

primary

agency

conflict

between

managers

and

shareholders

involves

the

overinvestment o f free cash flows - managers may choose to invest in negative net
present value projects. Prior literature in executive compensation suggests that equitybased compensation act as a vehicle to resolve the conflicts o f interests between
managers and shareholders. For example, prior studies suggest that stock and stock
options o f CEO compensation encourage risk-averse CEOs to manage their firms in ways
that benefit shareholders (Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009).
Agency conflicts between managers (or managers acting for shareholders) and
debt holders occur when managers increase firm risk in ways that benefit shareholders at
the expense of debt holders. Debt holders and shareholders have different payoff
structures - debt holders are fixed claimants to firm assets while shareholders are residual
claimants. Once debt is issued, shareholders may increase the value o f their residual
claims at the expense o f debt holders. For instance, shareholders may increase the risk o f
the firm by changing investment or financial policies (asset substitution or risk shifting)
in ways that reallocate wealth from debt holders, generally through some increase in the
overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and M eckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).
Similarly, excessive risk-taking by CEOs through M&As m ay transfer w ealth from debt
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holders to shareholders by decreasing assets available for meeting fixed claims which
increases default risk. Equity-based compensation may motivate m anagers to increase
overall firm risk through M&As. For instance, Datta, Datta, and Ram an (2001) find a
positive relation between equity-based com pensation and the change in stock return
volatility o f the acquirers.
Thus, while equity-based com pensation mitigates agency conflicts between
managers and shareholders, equity-based com pensation may exacerbate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders by motivating CEOs to take excessive risk at the
expense o f debtholders. Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders by aligning mangers w ith debt holders. For example,
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are
associated with less risky investment and financial policies. With respect to M &As, this
suggests that CEO inside debt compensation may mitigate excess risk taking by CEOs.
To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt on alleviating agency costs to
debtholders, I use a sample o f mergers and acquisitions (M&As). M &As are regarded as
one o f the firm’s major, externally observable investing decisions and this is especially
true given large capital commitments. In 2007, the aggregate deal value for acquisitions
o f US targets was $1.37 trillion, while aggregate capital expenditure activity was $1.85
trillion. This suggests that acquisition activity represents a large proportion o f corporate
investment (Garfinkel and Hankins, 2011).
There are at least two strong reasons why M&As offer a useful opportunity to test
the effect o f CEO inside debt on managerial risk-taking behavior. First, M &As represent
discretionary risk-taking by CEOs and so, M&A activity can dramatically alter the risk
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profile o f the firm by altering the asset structure. Second, M&As may be a possible
source o f agency conflicts between managers and principals (shareholders and
debtholders) even though M&As create value through the acquisition o f undervalued
assets or synergy. For example, agency costs occurring as a result o f overinvestm ent by
acquiring firms are often explained by the free cash hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Lang,
Stulz, and Walking, 1991) and the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986). Further, due to their
complexity, M&As are often sources o f inform ation asymmetry problem s, a necessary
condition for agency problems.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on post-m erger firm risk,
as measured by the change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk, using
acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f 2007 to 2009. Following prior literature on
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two m easures as
proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, which
is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio and
2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater
than one. I utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the
change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f
the Merton distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the
change in pre and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altm an bankruptcy
prediction model (Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-merger
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in
idiosyncratic risk measured as post-merger minus pre-m erger standard deviation o f return
residuals in percentage estimated by the single factor market model.
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I find a significant negative relation between post-m erger firm risk, as measured
by change in total firm risk, measured as post-m erger minus pre-m erger stock return
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post
merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage estimated
by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured by the CEO
to firm debt/equity ratio. CEO compensation is not exogenously given but determ ined by
the contracting environment and so, concern for endogeneity comes into the picture
which may make my findings spurious. I adopt the instrumental variable approach to
address the endogeneity problem. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias
corrections. I find insignificant negative relations between CEO inside debt holdings
other two measures o f post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and post-m erger distanceto-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the M erton distance-to-default model
developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008, and the change in pre and post-merger
default risk as calculated by the Altm an bankruptcy prediction model (Altm an, 1968).
I make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on executive
compensation focus primarily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and fixed
(salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like compensation are limited
due to data availability.13 This paper extends the literature by focusing on a different
component o f CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, this study provides a contribution
to a nascent literature on executive compensation which investigates the theoretical
prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by strengthening the alignment

13 C E O in sid e debt co m p en sa tio n is ava ila b le o n ly from 2 0 0 6 fiscal y ea r as e ffe c tiv e for 2 0 0 6 fiscal yearends, the SE C issued a requirem ent that firm s d is c lo se their C E O s’ in sid e debt p o sitio n s.
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o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011).
Further, I extend Phan (2013), who looks at the relation between CEO inside debt and
M&As, by investigating the relation between post-m erger risk and CEO inside debt
holdings. I also extend Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2012), w ho look at the effect o f CEO
inside debt on firms’ incentives to pursue diversifying acquisitions, by examining
whether CEO inside debt reduces firm risk after M&As. Finally, this study adds to the
M&A literature by documenting the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on post
merger firm risk. This is important because prior literature only examines the relation
between CEO equity-based com pensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman,
2001; Benson, Park and Davidson, 2011).
The remainder o f this essay is organized as follows. I m otivate my research,
review the literature, and develop my hypotheses, provide an overview o f sample
selection and variables used in this study, methodology, and a description o f my sample,
discusses empirical results and finish with a conclusion to the second essay.

Literature Review
Mergers and Acquisitions (M &As) and Agency Costs
M erger and acquisition decisions create opportunities that can intensify the
inherent conflicts o f interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Numerous studies find that corporate merger and acquisition decisions are often
related to agency conflicts. These studies recognize possible links between mergers and
managerial self-interest. It is well recognized that managers do not always make
shareholder value-maximizing acquisitions.
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Jensen (1986) suggests that the free cash flow hypothesis can be used to
understand overinvestment by acquiring firms. Jensen (1986) document that conflicts o f
interest between agents and owners are especially severe when the firm generates
substantial free cash flow, the cash flow in excess o f that required to fund all projects that
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost o f capital. The free
cash flow hypothesis argues that managers realize large personal gains from empire
building. Firms with abundant free cash flows but few profitable investment opportunities
are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions than to return the excess cash flows
to shareholders. Lang, Stulz, and W alkling (1991) provide empirical evidence supporting
the free cash flow hypothesis using a sample o f firms that decide to acquire control o f
other firms through tender offers. Roll (1986) presents a hubris hypothesis to explain
overinvestment by acquiring firms. According to the hubris hypothesis, managers
overestimate the value o f what they buy and so, m ost o f the times, they simply overpay.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) document that several corporate acquisitions seem to
be governed by the desire o f m anagers to switch into businesses w ith long term growth
potential even when the managers have no special expertise in running such businesses
when the value maximizing strategy should be to distribute free cash flows to
shareholders. Morck et al. (1990) recognize several types of acquisitions including
diversifying acquisitions and acquisitions o f high growth targets that can yield substantial
benefits to managers, while at the same time hurting shareholders. Recently, Masulis,
Wang and Xie (2007) focus on corporate acquisition decisions and find that bidders with
more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower abnormal returns around
acquisition announcements. The empirical results support the hypothesis that managers
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protected by more antitakeover provisions face weaker discipline from the m arket for
corporate control and so, tend to indulge in empire building acquisitions that destroy
shareholder returns.
Conversely, studies suggest that M &As may increase bondholder wealth through
the co-insurance effect as the probability o f default decreases when the assets and
liabilities o f two firms are combined through M &As as compared to the likelihood o f
default in individual firms (Levy and Samat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Higgins and Schall,
1975). The co-insurance effect suggests that diversifying M&As are beneficial to
bondholders because existing risky debt is spread across the new firm ’s operations which
have imperfectly correlated cash flows. Billet, King, and Mauer (2004) investigate the
wealth effects o f M&As on target and acquirer bondholders during 1980s and 1990s and
find that below investment grade bonds o f target firms earn significantly positive
announcement period returns in support o f co-insurance effect. On the other hand, Shastri
(1990) note that merged firm bondholders may either gain from co-insurance effect or
lose from expropriation effect when merging firms may have different leverage ratios,
risk levels, and debt maturities. Datta, Datta, and Raman (2001) note that if CEO
compensation is biased toward equity, acquirers tend to select riskier targets with higher
growth opportunities and acquirers become riskier following the M &A deals. This
suggests that during M&As CEO may engage in activities to increase firm risk beyond
that which debtholders prefer and this, in turn, leads to agency conflicts between
debtholders and managers or managers acting for shareholders.
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Inside Debt Compensation as a M eans to Reduce
Agency Costs o f Debt
Many CEOs in the US hold significant am ounts o f pay in the form o f defined
benefit pension plans and deferred compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei
and Yermack, 2011). These forms o f executive com pensation are defined as inside debt
(in the language o f Jensen and Meckling (1976)) as this compensation represents a fixed
obligation for the firm to make future payments to corporate insiders. Inside debt
compensation are unsecured and unfunded, exposing CEOs to the same default risks and
insolvency treatment as outside creditors. Therefore, CEO inside debt com pensation can
be used as a vehicle to mitigate the agency costs o f debt (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007;
Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2011; Cassell et al.,
2012 ).

Agency costs o f debt occur when managers vary the firm’s investm ent policy,
payout policy, or capital structure in ways that reallocate wealth from debtholders to
stockholders, generally through some increase in the overall risk o f the firm (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). To alleviate the agency costs o f debt,
Jensen and M eckling (1976) recommend implem enting an optimal incentive structure
under which the C EO ’s personal holdings o f the firm ’s debt and equity ratio is sim ilar to
the firm’s overall capital structure. Based on agency theory, studies on CEO inside debt
compensation find that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings prefer less risky
investment and financial policies (Cassell et al., 2012). Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
find that as the value o f a C EO ’s pension increases relative to the value o f her equity
holdings, risk taking, as measured by distance-to-default declines. Wei and Yermack
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) examine stockholder and bondholder reactions to firms’ initial reports o f their

CEO s’ inside debt positions in early 2007 when new SEC disclosure rules took effect.
The authors find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility o f both
securities drops upon disclosures by firms where the CEO has a sizeable defined benefit
pension or deferred compensation. This suggests that inside debt may reduce firm risk
and transfer wealth from equity toward debt. This is also consistent with the idea that
investors anticipate less risk taking by managers with higher levels o f inside debt.
Several recent studies also find a negative relation between CEO inside debt
holdings and the cost o f debt (Anantharam an et al., 2010; Chen, Dou, and W ang, 2010;
Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011). When compensation packages o f CEOs consist o f both inside
debt compensation and equity-based compensation, CEO incentives vary with the relative
importance o f debt versus equity based compensation in the pay structure (inside leverage
o f the CEO). The higher a C EO ’s inside leverage relative to firm leverage (the C EO s’
relative leverage), the more closely the C EO ’s incentives are aligned with debtholders
vis-a-vis shareholders and the lesser the degree to which CEO engages in risk-seeking
behavior to damage debt holders wealth (Edmans and Liu, 2011). A nantharam an et al.,
2010 argues that if debtholders realize the incentive effects o f CEO inside debt holdings,
firms providing CEOs with higher relative leverage should bear a lower borrowing cost
and fewer covenants. Utilizing a sample o f private loans originated during 2006-2008,
they find that higher CEO relative leverage is associated with lower cost o f debt
financing and fewer restrictive covenants. W ang et al., 2011 posit that banks demand
lower yield spreads and less strict terms on loans to firms where CEOs have large inside
debt holdings. Using a sample o f 1,280 loan facilities for 676 unique firms originated for
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the period o f 2007 to 2010, they find that banks charge lower yield spreads on loans
when CEOs o f those firms hold larger inside debt holdings. Empirical evidence also
shows that loans to firms providing CEOs with larger inside debt holdings are associated
with fewer covenant restrictions. This is consistent w ith the view that debtholders
anticipate lower expropriation risk by firms with larger CEO inside debt holdings. For
instance, Chen, Dou, and Wang (2010) find that public debtholders charge lower interest
rates to the firms providing CEOs with more inside debt. In addition, they find that the
level o f CEO inside debt holdings exhibits a negative relation w ith restrictive debt
covenants.

Hypothesis Developm ent
As such, CEO inside debt compensation may perform an essential alignm ent role
between CEOs and debtholders by reducing C E O s’ excessive risk-taking incentives.
Higher managerial inside debt serves to alleviate agency conflicts between m anagers and
debt holders by aligning mangers with debt holders. For example, Cassell, Huang,
Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated with
less risky investment and financial policies. CEOs can also reduce the riskiness o f their
firms’ operations by diversifying firm s’ operations among different industry segments
(Amihud and Lev, 1981; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Further, Cassell et al. (2012)
expect that CEO with large inside debt holdings diversify firm operations since
diversified firm faces a reduced exposure to bankruptcy. Based on prior literature, I
conjecture that, all else being equal, CEO inside debt is associated with a risk
management strategy in M&As. Large CEO inside debt holdings may m otivate CEOs to
engage in diversifying M&A in order to reduce firm risk. Consistent w ith the evidence
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that CEO inside debt compensation motivates CEOs to engage in less risky investment
and financial decisions, I expect that there exists a negative relation between post-m erger
firm risk and CEO inside debt compensation.
H i: The post-m erger risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
The implies that CEOs with higher inside debt compensation are more aligned
with debtholders and so, they are more likely to conduct less risky M &As that are more
likely to benefit debtholders.

Sample Selection and Data
Sample Selection
I obtain the initial sample o f corporate acquisitions from Securities Data
Corporation (SDC). I focus only on acquisitions o f United States (U.S.) targets to reduce
the potential effect o f risks o f targets’ domicile countries on my empirical tests. My
initial sample includes M &As announced between 2007 and 2009. 2007 marks the
beginning o f the sample period because 2006 is the first year that EX ECU CO M P reports
CEO pension and deferred compensation information. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) required all firms to expand executive compensation disclosure
effective in 2006 fiscal year end. Following conventions in the M&A literature, I require
that the sample satisfy the following criteria: ( 1 ) the deal should be com pleted, ( 2 ) the
transaction value needs to be at least one million dollars, (3) The acquirer controls less
than 50% o f the shares o f the target at the time o f the announcement and obtains 100% o f
the target shares, and (4) necessary information on each transaction should be available.
Necessary information includes transaction date, types (merger vs. tender offer). I match
this initial data with COM PUSTAT for accounting data and Center for Research in
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Securities Prices (CRSP) for stock price data. I then merge the sample with compensation
information from Standard and Poor’s EXECUCOM P database. EXECUCOM P includes
annual compensation data from proxy statements for the five highest paid executives for
firms in the S&P 500, the S&P M idCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600.
Following prior literature, I exclude all financial firm s (SIC codes 6000-6999) as
liquidity is hard to access in these firms. I also exclude all utility firms (SIC codes 49004999) due to their unique regulatory environment. My final sample does not include all
equity acquirers (zero debt) or acquires having missing debt as CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio cannot be computed for these firms. This may raise a question if CEO inside debt
compensation does not matter for all-equity firms. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue
that the incentive impact o f debt and equity holdings o f CEOs depends on the capital
structure o f the firm. When a firm has debt and equity in its capital structure, then the
CEO tends to shift risk from shareholders to debtholders if the CEO has only equity
holdings in the firm. Compensating CEOs with pension and deferred com pensation aligns
interests o f CEOs with that o f debtholders which in turn, reduces agency costs o f debt.
CEO inside debt compensation impacts on decision-m aking by CEOs only when firm has
debt in the capital structure. Therefore, CEO inside debt compensation does not matter
for all-equity firms as risk shifting from shareholders to debtholders by CEOs does not
happen for these firms.
Some acquirers in my sample made more than one M&A announcem ent in a year.
To rule out the possibility that empirical results can be driven by serial M &As pursed by
these acquirers, I keep only the earliest merger pursued by each acquirer in a given year.
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After deleting firms with missing values for explanatory variables, I have a final m atched
sample o f 330 deals from 2007 to 2009.
Variable Descriptions
The prim ary dependent variable is post-m erger equity risk. The prim ary
independent variable is CEO inside debt holdings. I also include several additional
control variables that are related to both M&A and CEO inside debt holdings. Appendix
B provides a precise description o f all the variables utilized in my analysis.
Post-M erger Equity Risk
I am planning to use the difference in distance-to default before and after the
merger as the main dependent variable. The change in the distance-to-default o f a firm is
utilized as an indicator to show if the M &A increase the value o f the firm and as a
consequence the distance-to-default became larger. The distance-to-default will be
calculated before and after the merger year where the merger year is the year when the
merger became effective. The difference between the resulting num bers will be the
dependent variable. I will utilize a naive alternative o f the Merton distance-to-default
model (developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008) to calculate the distance-to-default
before and after the merger. The method is as described below:
First, the market value o f equity, the face value o f debt, the volatility o f stock
returns and the risk-free rate are obtained. The market value o f a firm ’s equity is
measured as the product o f the acquirer’s share price and the number o f shares. The face
value o f debt is calculated as the sum o f current liabilities and one h alf o f the com pany’s
long-term debt, following Bharath & Shumway (2008) and Vassalou & Xing (2004). The
volatility o f stock returns is estimated by calculating the annualized percent standard
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deviation o f returns using prior m onthly stock return data from the CRSP database. Last,
the acquirer’s stock return over the year previous to the M &A is generated. The derived
inputs are then used to calculate the missing variables which are the volatility o f the
firm ’s debt, the total firm volatility and finally the naive distance-to-default. The
following formulas based on Bharath and Shumway (2008) are used to calculate the
distance-to-default:
Volatility o f each firm ’s debt
Naive oD = 0.05 + 0.25 *oE
Total volatility o f the firm
Naive aV = (E / E + naive D) *aE + (naive D / E + naive D) *naive oD
= ( E / E + F)*oE + ( F / E + F)*(0.05 + 0.25*aE)
Naive distance-to-default
Naive DD = [In((E + F)/F) + (r„./ - 0.5 naive ov2)T ] / naive ovv!t (Equation 12 o f
Bharath and Shumway (2008) paper)
Altman Bankruptcy Prediction Model (Altman, 1968) is used as an alternative
model to measure a firm ’s default risk. Altm an bankruptcy prediction model classifies a
firm as bankrupt if it yields a z-score below 1.8 (Altm an, 1968)and a firm is likely to be
financially sound if the Z-score o f the firm is greater than 2.99.Following
study, the Altman Z-Score is calculated using the equation given below:
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5
where X I = working capital / total assets
X2 = retained earnings / total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and tax / total assets

prior M&A
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X4 = market value o f equity / book value o f total debt
X5 = sales / total assets
Further following prior literature on CEO com pensation and M&A, my study will
utilize another two measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: change in total firm risk
measured as post-merger minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage
and change in idiosyncratic risk measured as post-m erger minus pre-m erger standard
deviation o f return residuals in percentage estim ated by the single factor market model. I
use daily stock returns for the standard deviation calculation but non-tabulated results
using monthly return volatilities are similar to my m ain findings.
CEO Inside Debt Holdings
The primary explanatory variable is CEO inside debt holdings measured at the
end o f the fiscal year (t-1) relative to the M&A announcement. Following prior literature
on CEO inside debt holdings (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012), I use two m easures for CEO
inside debt holdings: 1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable
equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one. The first
measure, the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, is calculated as the C EO ’s debt/equity ratio
scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio. The C E O ’s debt/ equity ratio is calculated as
CEO inside debt holdings scaled by CEO equity holdings. CEO inside debt holdings are
calculated as the sum o f the present value o f accumulated pension benefits and deferred
compensation. CEO equity holdings are calculated as the value o f both stock and stock
options held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated by m ultiplying the
number o f shares held by the stock price at the firm ’s fiscal year end and the value o f
option is calculated by multiplying the total option delta (using the Black-Scholes (1973))
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by the stock price at the firm ’s fiscal year end. Firm debt is the sum o f current and long
term debt. Firm equity is the product o f shares outstanding and the stock price at the
firm’s fiscal year end. My second measure is an indicator variable equal to one when the
CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater than one (i.e. the CEO is more levered than the
firm), and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
CEO compensation incentives. I include additional control variables to proxy for
CEO compensation incentives that influence post-m erger firm risk. Following prior
literature (for example, Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen,
2006), I measure CEO compensation incentives by the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock
return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity o f CEO wealth to stock

price (delta).

Following prior literature on CEO inside debt (for example, Cassell et al., 2012), I
construct the ratio o f the vega to delta (CEO vega/delta ratio) to control for the effects o f
equity-based incentives on CEO risk-taking preferences. I adjust the CEO vega/delta ratio
by multiplying it by the ratio o f total CEO equity holdings to CEO inside debt to capture
the relative importance o f the C EO ’s accumulated equity holdings . 1 4
Firm-specific control variables. I include several control variables based on the
previous M&A literature and CEO inside debt literature. Following Sundaram and
Yermack (2007), I control for firm size (the log o f total assets) and leverage (long-term
debt/total assets) because default risk is generally large for small firms and highly
leveraged firms. Jensen (1993) argues that monitoring o f high-growth firms is costly
while Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that firms with higher stock return volatility have
14 If C E O eq u ity h o ld in g s are large (sm a ll), the e ffe c t o f the C E O v eg a /d elta ratio is lik e ly to b e large
(sm all).
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higher levels o f information asymmetry. Following prior literature (B erger and Ofek,
1995; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002), I include T obin’s Q, the level o f R&D expenditures
(R&D/total assets), the level o f advertising expenditures (adverting expense/ total assets),
capital expenditures (capital expenditures/sales), and prior total firm risk to proxy for
growth opportunities and information asymmetry. The relation between CEO inside debt
compensation and post-merger firm risk may also depend on the characteristics o f the
merger transaction. Following Benson, Park and D avidson (2011), I include a dummy
variable equal to one if the acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy)
and the ratio o f transaction value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio).

M ethodology
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on post-m erger firm risk in
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f post-merger firm risk on
CEO inside debt compensation. To examine the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on
post-merger firm risk I employ the following model:
DID| tfi = a + Pi (CEO inside debt compensation) , / + ftk (controls) , + /?, £ ( 2 d ig it SIC d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + fiy Y S y e a r d u m m y v a r ia b le s ), + eit
As CEO compensation is not exogenously given but determ ined by the
contracting environment, there is a concern for endogeneity. The estim ated coefficients in
my regressions may be biased as CEO com pensation is endogenously formed. The main
problem o f my analysis is that there can be omitted firm characteristics and CEO
characteristics that affect both CEO compensation and the firm ’s M &A decisions.
Therefore, after presenting multivariate regressions o f post-merger firm risk on CEO

75
inside debt compensation, I adopt an instrument variable (IV) approach to address the
endogeneity problem.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample. All continuous variables
are winsorized at upper and lower

1

% o f the sample distribution to address potential

problems associated with extreme observations. Panel A o f Table 2.1 provides the
distribution o f the sample firms across years. The number o f M&A deals decreases from
135 in 2007 to 85 in 2009, which coincides with the recent financial crisis in US.
Panel B o f Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics o f acquirer firm. I find that the
mean (median) acquirer CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is 2.034 (0.273). The mean
(median) CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l is 0.353 (0.000) indicating that C EO ’s debt-toequity ratio is less than firm ’s debt-to-equity ratio for the majority o f m y sample firms.

Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year
year
2007
2008
2009
Total

Frequency
135
1 1 0

85
330

Percent
40.91
33.33
25.76
1 0 0
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Panel B: Summary Statistics

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio > 1
Firm Size
Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Deal Ratio
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

N
330
330
330
330
330
330
330
330
330
330

Mean
2.034
0.353
8.131
0.231
2.379
0.042
0 .0 1 1

0.079
0.143
0.294

Std.Dev
5.891
0.417
1.685
0.147
3.896
0.063
0.034
0.141
0.162
0.317

P25

0.000
0.000
7.092
0.178
0.893

0.000
0.000
0.024
0.019
0.072

M edian
0.273

P75
1.459

0.000

1.000

8.269
0.203
1.397
0.016

9.594
0.305
2.584
0.069
0.005
0.076
0.184
0.461

0.000
0.046
0.081
0.196

Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics o f my sample. Variables include the
natural log o f one plus the ratio o f C EO ’s debt-to-equity ratio (CEO to firm debt/equity
ratio), a dummy variable that equals one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than
one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l), the ratio o f CEO vega to the
delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the
ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research and
development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio o f advertising expense to total
assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value of
debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q) and the ratio o f transaction value to acquirer’s market
value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in
Appendix B. Data are obtained from SDC, COM PUSTAT, CRSP and EXECUCOM P
and consist o f 330 deals from 2007 to 2009. Panel A reports sample distribution by year.
Panel B reports descriptive statistics o f independent variables utilized in this study.
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Empirical Results
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on post-m erger firm risk in
this section. I begin by employing multivariate regressions o f post-m erger firm risk on
CEO inside debt compensation.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt H oldings on Post-M erger Firm Risk,
Measured by Bharath and Shumway (2008)
Distance-to-Default M odel
I begin by examining the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-m erger
firm risk. It is noteworthy to mention that distant-to-default increases for 99 firms out o f
330 firms while distance-to-default deceases for other 231 firms after the M&A.
Following prior studies on M&A and CEO com pensation, I examine the effect o f lagged
CEO inside debt compensation o f post-m erger firm risk to control for potential
endogeneity o f compensation incentives. Table 2.2 reports the results o f multivariate
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first m easure o f
CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and Four include
the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l.

Table 2.2
The Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger Firm Risk, M easured by
Bharath and Shumway (2008) Distance-to-Default M odel

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l
Firm Size
Leverage

(1)__________ (2)_________(3)__________(4)
-0.0193
-0.0074
(- 0 .2 2 )
(-0.61)
-0.0102
-0.0045
(-0.80)
(-0.97)
-0.461
-0.445
(-0.59)
(-0.52)
15.37 ***
15.59

***
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Table 2.2 (Continued)

Tobin’s Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Stock Dummy
Deal Ratio
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
330

Adj. R 2

0.27

(2.93)
(2.78)
27.13 ***
27.37
(14.21)
(13.44)
0.0451 ***
0.0476
(3.62)
(3.85)
-0.0001
-0.0002
(-0.27)
(-0.19)
0.013 ***
0.015
(2.71)
(2.95)
-0.769 **
-0.834
(-2.08)
(-2.19)
0.007
0.006
(0.33)
(0.47)
0.0004
0.0002
(0.63)___________________ (0.51)
YES
YES
YES
330
330
330
0.34

0.24

***
***

***
**

0.31

Table 2.2 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-m erger
firm risk, measured as the difference in distance-to default before and after the merger
utilizing a naive alternative o f the Merton distance-to-default model (developed by
Bharath and Shumway, 2008). All models control for industry and year fixed effect,
where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification. The
dependent variable is the change in distance-to-default before and after the merger. The
two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings:
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l).
Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO V ega/D elta Ratio), the
natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current
liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the ratio o f capital expenditures to sales
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(CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research and developm ent expense to total assets
(R&D/sales), the ratio o f advertising expense to total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio
o f market value o f the equity plus the book value o f debt to the total assets (T obin’s Q), a
dummy variable that equal to one if the acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock
Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal
Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is
2006 - 2010. M odels One and Two report results where the main explanatory variable is
the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while
Models Three and Four report results where the m ain explanatory variable is the second
measure o f CEO inside debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l). The r-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance of
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative but
interestingly they are not significant in M odels One and Two. The results do not support
H i, which predicts that post-merger firm risk, m easured as distance-to-default, is
decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. My conclusions are unchanged using an
alternative proxy for inside debt in Models Three and Four. The estimated coefficients on
CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not significant. Overall, no significant
relation is detected between CEO inside debt holdings and the firm ’s engagem ent in
M&A to decrease firm risk.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger Firm Risk,
Measured by Altman (1968) Bankruptcy Prediction Model
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-m erger firm
risk, measured by using the Altman bankruptcy prediction model (Altm an, 1968). Table

2.3 reports the results o f multivariate regressions w ith controls for industry and year fixed
effect. Models One and Two report results for the full sample where the m ain explanatory
variable is the first measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio.
Models Three and Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings,
CEO to firm debt/equity ra tio > l.

Table 2.3
The Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger Firm Risk, M easured by Altm an
(1968) Bankruptcy Prediction M odel

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
-0.4043
(-0.78)

(2 )
-0.3791
(-0.37)

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l

(3)

(4)

-0.4703
(-0.63)

-0.4437
(-0.42)
-12.51
(-0.47)
721.85
(0.97)
533.13
(1.35)
0.009 *
(1.98)
-0.0003
(-1.23)
0.008 **
(2.37)
-0.739 *
(-1.87)
0.0006
(0.53)

-12.35
(-0.23)
715.74
(0.65)
523.24
(1.41)
0.007 *
(2.19)
-0.0003
(-1.09)
0.009 **
(2.24)
-0.713 *
(-1.73)
0.0005
(0.28)

Firm Size
Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Stock Dummy
Deal Ratio
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

0 . 0 0 0 1

Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
330

(0.84)
YES
330

Adj. R 2

0.19

0 . 2 2

0 . 0 0 0 2

YES
330

(0.72)
YES
330

0 . 2 0

0.23
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Table 2.3 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-m erger
firm risk, measured as the difference default risk before and after the merger utilizing
Altman (1968) Bankruptcy Prediction Model. All models control for industry and year
fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fam a and French 49 industry
classification. The dependent variable is the change in A ltm an Z-score before and after
the merger. The two main independent variables are two measures to proxy CEO inside
debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dummy variable with a value o f one if
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise (CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the delta (CEO
Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f long-term
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the ratio o f
capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research and developm ent
expense to total assets

(R&D/sales), the ratio o f advertising expense to total assets

(Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value o f debt to
the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if the acquisition is
financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction value to
acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are
reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and Two report
results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f CEO inside debt
holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while M odels Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative but
interestingly they are not significant in M odels One and Two. The results do not support
H i, which predicts that post-merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
My conclusions are unchanged using an alternative proxy for inside debt in M odels Three
and Four. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not
significant. Overall, no significant relation is detected between CEO inside debt holdings
and post-merger firm risk. My results do not support the argument that CEOs with higher
inside debt holdings are more aligned with debtholders by conducting less risky M&As
that are more likely to benefit debtholders.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger
Firm Risk, M easured by Total Firm-Risk
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-m erger firm
risk, measured by change in total firm risk. A change in total risk is m easured as post
merger minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily
stock returns for the standard deviation calculation . 1 5 Table 2.4 reports the results of
multivariate regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. M odels One and
Two report results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first
measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. M odels Three and
Four include the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm
debt/equity ratio> 1 .

15 N on -tab u lated results u sin g m on th ly return v o la tilitie s are sim ilar to m y main fin d in g s.
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Table 2.4
The Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger Firm Risk, M easured by Total
Firm Risk

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
-0.0063
(-1.85)

*

(2 )
-0.0057 *
(-1.76)

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l

(3)

-0.009
(-1.17)

Firm Size
Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Stock Dummy
Deal Ratio
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
330

Adj. R2

0 .2 1

-0.093
(-0.63)
0.773
(0.93)
0.131
(1.56)
0.0078 **
(2.32)
-0.0071
(-0.87)
0.0084 **
(2.38)
-0.835 **
(-2.43)
0.113
(0.19)
0.00008
(1.03)
YES
330

YES
330

0.23

0 . 2 2

(4)

-0.0084
(-1.03)
-0.024
(-0.37)
0.835
(0.64)
0.157
(1.33)
0.0083 **
(2.27)
-0.0083
(-1.06)
0.0092 **
(2.17)
-0.863 **
(-2.24)
0 . 1 2 1

( 0 .2 0 )
0.00009
(1.07)
YES
330
0.24

Table 2.4 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-m erger
firm risk, measured as the change in total firm risk. All models control for industry and
year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fam a and French 49 industry
classification. The dependent variable is the change in total risk measured as post-m erger
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock
returns for the standard deviation calculation. The two m ain independent variables are
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two measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio > l). Control variables are the ratio of
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm
Size), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets
(Leverage), the ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research
and development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio of advertising expense to
total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f m arket value o f the equity plus the book
value o f debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one i f the
acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction
value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all
variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. M odels One and
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first m easure o f CEO inside
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative and
significant in Models One and Two. The results support H i, which predicts that post
merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. In Models Three and Four,
the estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity >1 are negative but not significant.
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Overall, multivariate results indicate some evidence that CEO inside debt holdings have a
negative impact on the change in acquirer firm risk.
Effect o f CEO Inside Debt H oldings on Post-M erger Firm Risk,
Measured by Idiosyncratic Risk
Next, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-m erger firm
risk, measured by change in idiosyncratic risk. A change in idiosyncratic risk is m easured
as post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model. Table 2.5 reports the results o f multivariate
regressions with controls for industry and year fixed effect. Models One and Two report
results for the full sample where the main explanatory variable is the first m easure o f
CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. Models Three and Four include
the alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ra tio > l.

Table 2.5
The Effect o f CEO Inside Debt Holdings on Post-M erger Firm Risk, M easured by
Idiosyncratic Risk
__________________________________________ (!)__________(2)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
-0.007
* -0.006
(-1.81)
(-1.89)
CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l
Firm Size
Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales

-0.023
(-0.45)
-0.347
(0.87)
-0.037
(-1.41)
-0.187
(-1.74)
0.474
(1.69)
-0.068

(3)

(4)

*
-0.078
(- 0 . 1 1 )

*
*

-0.081
(-0.35)
-0.029
(-0.53)
-0.307
(0.73)
-0.034
(-1.29)
-0.158
(-1.83)
0.459
(1.78)
-0.074
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
(-0.76)
-0.517 *
(-1.74)
0.061

Stock Dummy
Deal Ratio
Table 2.5 (Continued)

(-0.71)
-0.501 *
(-1.86)
0.064

(0.16)

Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
330

-0 . 0 0 0 2
(-1.17)
YES
330

Adj. R 2

0.14

0.17

CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

YES
330

(0.13)
-0.0003
(-1.32)
YES
330

0.16

0.17

Table 2.5 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-m erger
firm risk, measured by the change in idiosyncratic risk. All models control for industry
and year fixed effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry
classification. The dependent variable is the change in idiosyncratic risk m easured as
post-merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model. The two main independent variables are two
measures to proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a
dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one
and zero otherwise (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio> l). Control variables are the ratio o f
CEO vega to the delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm
Size), the sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets
(Leverage), the ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research
and development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio of advertising expense to
total assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book
value o f debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if the
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acquisition is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction
value to acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all
variables are reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. M odels One and
Two report results where the main explanatory variable is the first m easure o f CEO inside
debt holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are negative and
significant in Models One and Two. The results support H i, which predicts that post
merger firm risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. In Models Three and Four,
the estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity>l are negative but not significant.
Overall, multivariate results indicate some weak evidence that CEO inside debt holdings
have a negative impact on the change in acquirer firm risk, measured by the change in
idiosyncratic risk.

Exploring Endogeneity
My multivariate analysis is based on OLS regression. My analysis assumes that
CEO inside debt compensation is exogenous whereas CEO inside debt compensation
could be determined endogenously with the M &A decision. The possibility that CEO
inside debt compensation is endogenous gives rise to two related concerns. First, the
direction o f causality between CEO inside debt com pensation and firm ’s M &A decision
is hard to conclude. It is possible that M&A decision change firm value which requires

88
the adjustment in CEO inside debt compensation. This imply that the contem poraneous
relation between CEO inside debt compensation and firm’s M&A decision is subject to
the concern that M&A decisions lead to changes in CEO inside debt com pensation. By
estimating the impact o f CEO inside debt holdings on future firm ’s M & A decision, I
attempt to control for the potential endogeneity that exists between CEO com pensation
structure and firm cash policy.
Second,

the

model

specification

suffers

an

omitted

variable

bias

and

consequently, the model does not capture all determinants o f firm’s M &A decision and
there are unobserved firm-specific and CEO-specific characteristics that influence both
firm ’s M&A decision and CEO inside debt compensation. I adopt an instrum ent variable
approach to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. I discuss this approach and
empirical results in the following section.

Instrumental Variable Approach
Prior literature on CEO com pensation employs an instrumental variable approach
(IV) is to address endogeneity problem. Following prior literature on CEO inside debt
compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Anantharaman et al., 2011 and Cassell et
al., 2012), I include the following variables as instruments for CEO inside debt holdings:
CEO age16; Firm age; a dummy variable (Liquidity Constraint) that equals to one if the
firm is facing liquidity constraint indicated by negative operating cash flow, and zero
otherwise; a dummy variable (Tax Status) that equals to one if the firm has favorable tax
status identified by if the firm has a loss carry-forward, and zero otherw ise; maximum

16 F o llo w in g C a ssell et al., 2 0 1 2 , 1 d o not in clu d e C E O tenure a s another instrum ent sin c e C E O a g e and
C E O tenure tend to be h igh ly correlated.
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state

tax

rate

on

individual

income.

http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/ and

The

tax

these rates

rates
are

are

obtained

calculated

using

from
the

TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). I estimate my models using a two-stage
least-squares framework to explicitly account for endogeneity issue. In the first stage, I
separately regress CEO inside debt holdings on all o f the independent variables along
with the instruments. The second stage then utilizes the predicted value o f CEO inside
debt holdings from the first stage.
Table 2.6 reports the second-stage regression in which CEO inside debt holding is
replaced by its predicted value from its respective first-stage regression. The dependent
variable is change in total firm risk. A change in total risk is measured as post-merger
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock
returns for the standard deviation calculation. M odels One and Two report results for the
full sample where the main explanatory variable is the predicted values o f first measure
o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. M odels Three and Four
include the predicted values o f alternative measure o f CEO inside debt holdings, CEO to
firm debt/equity ratio>l. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity ratio are
negative and significant in Models One and Two. This supports H i, which predicts that
post-merger risk is decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings. The estim ated coefficient of
the alternative proxy for CEO inside debt in Models Three and Four is negative but not
significant. The estimated coefficients on CEO to firm debt/equity> 1 are positive and
significant. Overall, results from two-stage least-squares framework provide some
evidence that the firm post-merger risk, m easured by the change in total firm risk, is
decreasing in CEO inside debt holdings.
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Table 2.6
2SLS Regressions o f Post-M erger Firm Risk on C EO Inside Debt H oldings

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio

(1)
-0.0074 *
(-1.67)

(2)
-0.0069 *
(-1.73)

CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l
Firm Size

Industry and year fixed effect
N

YES
297

-0.076
(-0.73)
0.645
(0.87)
0.234
(1.55)
0.0089 **
(2.49)
-0.0063
(-0.58)
0.0093 *
(1.81)
-1.015 **
(-2.19)
0.091
(0.38)
0.0002
(0.71)
YES
297

Adj. R2

0.24

0.25

Leverage
Tobin's Q
R&D/Total Assets
Adv./Total Assets
CAPEX/Sales
Stock Dummy
Deal Ratio
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

(3)

(4)

-0.0095
(-0.49)

YES
297

-0.0089
(-0.31)
-0.068
(-0.46)
0.664
(0.94)
0.229
(1.48)
0.0096 **
(2.33)
-0.0069
(-0.72)
0.0095 *
(1.93)
-1.003 **
(-2.08)
0.097
(0.23)
0.0001
(0.79)
YES
297

0.25

0.26

Table 2.6 reports results o f the effect o f CEO inside debt holdings on post-m erger
firm risk, measured as the change in total firm risk, in two stage least square where in the
first stage CEO inside debt holdings are regressed on all independent variables plus
instruments and in the second stage post-merger firm risk is regressed on the predicted
values o f CEO inside debt compensation. All models control for industry and year fixed
effect, where industry is defined based on Fama and French 49 industry classification.
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The dependent variable is the change in total risk measured as post-m erger minus pre
merger stock return standard deviation in percentage and I use daily stock returns for the
standard deviation calculation. The two main independent variables are two measures to
proxy CEO inside debt holdings: CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, and a dum m y variable
with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio is larger than one and zero otherwise
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). Control variables are the ratio o f CEO vega to the
delta (CEO Vega/Delta Ratio), the natural logarithm o f net assets (Firm Size), the sum o f
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total assets (Leverage), the
ratio o f capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/Sales), the ratio o f research and
development expense to total assets (R&D/sales), the ratio o f advertising expense to total
assets (Adv./Total Assets), the ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value of
debt to the total assets (Tobin’s Q), a dummy variable that equal to one if the acquisition
is financed entirely with stock (Stock Dummy) and the ratio o f transaction value to
acquirer’s market value o f equity (Deal Ratio). Detailed definitions o f all variables are
reported in Appendix B. Sample period is 2006 - 2010. Models One and Two report
results where the main explanatory variable is the first measure o f CEO inside debt
holdings (CEO to firm debt/equity ratio) while Models Three and Four report results
where the main explanatory variable is the second measure o f CEO inside debt holdings
(CEO to firm debt/equity ratio>l). The /-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts *, ** and *** indicate levels o f significance o f 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Conclusion
Pension and deferred compensation, inside debt, may mitigate agency conflicts
between managers and debt holders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu,
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). In the
language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a fixed obligation for
the firm to make future payments to executives. Further, inside debt is typically an
unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded nature o f
inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatm ent as
outside creditors. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause CEOs to manage
their firms conservatively (Jensen and M eckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Inside
debt may also influence managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers (Sundaram
and Yermack, 2007). This paper attempts to answ er whether higher CEO inside debt
causes CEO to diversify firm operations and reduce firm risk by exam ining the effect of
CEO inside debt holdings on post-merger firm risk.
I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on post-m erger firm risk,
as measured by the change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk, using
acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f 2007 to 2009. Following prior literature on
CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the following two measures as
proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio, which
is calculated as the CEO’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm ’s debt to equity ratio and
2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio is greater
than one. I utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the
change in pre and post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative of
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the Merton distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the
change in pre and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altm an bankruptcy
prediction model (Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-merger
minus pre-merger stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in
idiosyncratic risk measured as post-merger minus pre-m erger standard deviation o f return
residuals in percentage estimated by the single factor market model.
I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as measured
by change in total firm risk, measured as post-m erger minus pre-m erger stock return
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post
merger minus pre-merger standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage estimated
by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured by the CEO
to firm debt/equity ratio. CEO com pensation is not exogenously given but determined by
the contracting environment and so, concern for endogeneity comes into the picture
which may make my findings spurious. I adopt an instrumental variable approach to
address the endogeneity problem. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias
corrections. I find insignificant negative relations between CEO inside debt holdings
other two measures o f post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and post-m erger distanceto-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the M erton distance-to-default model
developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008, and the change in pre and post-merger
default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model (Altm an, 1968).
As documented in Sundaram and Yermack (2007), by affecting both the overall
level o f CEO compensation and its composition, CEO inside debt holdings may influence
managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers. Thus my research question of

94
whether and how CEO inside debt is related to post merger firm risk remains an
important question. I make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on
executive compensation focus primarily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and
fixed (salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like com pensation are
limited due to data availability. CEO inside debt compensation is available only from
2006 fiscal year as effective 2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that
firms disclose their CEO s’ inside debt positions. This paper extends the literature by
focusing on a different component o f CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, this study
provides a contribution to a nascent literature on executive com pensation which
investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by
strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Finally, this study adds to the M &A literature by
documenting the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-merger firm risk. This
is important because prior literature only examines the relation between CEO equitybased compensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2001; Benson, Park and
Davidson, 2011).

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSION
CEO inside debt compensation, mainly com prised of pension and deferred
compensation, may mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt holders by
aligning the interests o f mangers with those o f debt holders ((Sundaram and Yermack,
2007; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and
Stuart, 2012). In the language o f Jensen and M eckling (1976), “inside debt” represents a
fixed obligation for the firm to make future paym ents to executives. Further, inside debt
is typically an unsecured and unfunded liability for the firm. The unsecured and unfunded
nature o f inside debt exposes managers to the same default risks and insolvency treatm ent
as outside debt holders. This aligns managers with debt holders and may cause m anagers
to manage their firms conservatively (Jensen and M eckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu,
2011). Studies on CEO inside debt compensation are lim ited due to data availability.
CEO inside debt compensation is available only from 2006 fiscal year as effective for
2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirement that firms disclose their C E O s’
inside debt positions. This dissertation comprises o f two essays that look at the relation
between CEO inside debt holdings and two different corporate policies: corporate cash
holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
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Following prior literature on CEO inside debt holdings (Cassell et al., 2012), I use the
following two measures as proxies for CEO inside debt compensation: (1) the CEO to
firm debt/equity ratio, which is calculated as the C E O ’s debt/equity ratio scaled by the
firm ’s debt to equity ratio and 2) an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO to firm
debt/ equity ratio is greater than one.
In the first essay, I examine the effect CEO inside debt holdings on firm cash
holdings, as measured by the ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets using a
sample o f EXECUCOMP firms over the period o f 2006 to 2008. Higher CEO inside debt
compensation alleviates agency conflicts between m anagers and debt holders by aligning
mangers with debt holders. CEOs with higher inside debt m ay prefer to invest in cash as
cash holdings are less risky projects (Tong, 2010). Consequently, based on risk-aversion
hypothesis, I posit a positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings and corporate
cash holdings. I find a significant and positive relation between CEO inside debt holdings
and firm cash holdings. I find that the positive relation between CEO inside debt
compensation and firm cash holdings remain significant even after controlling for the
effect o f CEO equity-based incentives on firm cash holdings. I also find that the positive
relation between CEO inside debt holdings and firm cash holdings is mitigated by the
financial constraint status o f the firm based on the notion that CEOs o f a financially
constrained firms may face difficulty accum ulating excess cash as their inside debt
compensation goes up since capital is limited. I adopt instrumental variable approach to
explicitly address the endogeneity problem as CEO com pensation is endogenously
determined by firm and CEO characteristics. M y main findings still hold after
endogeneity bias corrections and findings are robust to alternative specifications.
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Utilizing a modified version o f the Fama and French (1998) valuation regression, I find
that cash increases have a more positive valuation effect for firms with low levels o f CEO
inside debt relative to those with high levels o f CEO inside debt.
In the second essay, I examine the effect o f CEO inside debt com pensation on
post-merger firm risk using acquiring firm risk changes over the period o f 2007 to 2 0 0 9 .1
utilize four alternative measures to proxy for post-merger firm risk: the change in pre and
post-merger distance-to-default risk calculated by a naive alternative o f the M erton
distance-to-default model developed by Bharath and Shumway, 2008; the change in pre
and post-merger default risk as calculated by the Altman bankruptcy prediction model
(Altman, 1968); change in total firm risk measured as post-acquisition minus pre
acquisition stock return standard deviation in percentage; and change in idiosyncratic risk
measured as post-acquisition minus pre-acquisition standard deviation o f return residuals
in percentage estimated by the single factor market model. Prior literature on CEO inside
debt finds that CEO inside debt compensation motivates CEOs to engage in less risky
investment and financial decisions. For example, Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart
(2012) find that higher levels o f CEO inside debt are associated w ith less risky
investment and financial policies. Based on empirical findings o f prior literature, I
conjecture a negative relation between CEO inside debt holdings and post-m erger firm
risk. I find a significant negative relation between post-merger firm risk, as measured by
change in total firm risk, measured as post-acquisition minus pre-acquisition stock return
standard deviation in percentage, and change in idiosyncratic risk, measured as post
acquisition minus pre-acquisition standard deviation o f return residuals in percentage
estimated by the single factor market model and CEO inside debt holdings as measured
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by the CEO to firm debt/equity ratio. I adopt the instrumental variable approach to
address the endogeneity problem as CEO com pensation is endogenously determ ined by
firm and CEO characteristics. My main findings still hold after endogeneity bias
corrections.
As documented in Sundaram and Yermack (2007), by affecting both the overall
level o f CEO compensation and its composition, CEO inside debt may influence
managerial incentives to pursue diversifying mergers. Thus my research question o f
whether and how CEO inside debt is related to post merger firm risk remains an
important question. Similarly, CEO inside debt may affect corporate cash holdings o f a
firm by influencing managerial incentives and so, my research question o f whether and
how CEO inside debt is related to corporate cash holdings remains a key question.
Both essays make several contributions to the literature. First, prior studies on
executive compensation focus prim arily on equity-based (stocks and stock-options) and
fixed (salary and bonus) compensation, while studies on debt-like com pensation are
limited due to data availability. CEO inside debt compensation is available only from
2006 fiscal year as effective for 2006 fiscal year-ends, the SEC issued a requirem ent that
firms disclose their CEO s’ inside debt positions. Both essays extend the literature by
focusing on a different component o f CEO compensation, inside debt. Second, both
essays provide a contribution to a nascent literature on executive com pensation which
investigates the theoretical prediction that inside debt mitigate agency costs o f debt by
strengthening the alignment o f CEO and debtholder incentives (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). To date, extant research (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong,
2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011;
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Francis and Yilmaz, 2012; He, 2011) has focused on market-based im plications o f CEO
inside debt holdings (e.g. reduced cost o f debt, few er restrictive debt covenants, market
reactions after initial disclosures o f CEO inside debt compensation, financial reporting
quality, etc.).
Finally, the first essay adds to the corporate cash holdings literature by
documenting the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on corporate cash holdings.
Prior literature documents several m otives for firms to hold cash (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz,
2009): the transaction motive, the precautionary motive, the tax motive, and the agency
motive. The literature on corporate cash holdings em pirically examines agency theory by
viewing cash holdings as a source o f financing. M y study contributes to the agency
motive view o f corporate cash holdings literature by focusing on the investm ent
perspective o f cash holdings and by exploring the link between CEO inside debt and
corporate cash-holdings. The second essay adds to the M &A literature by docum enting
the effect o f CEO inside debt compensation on post-m erger firm risk. This is important
because prior literature only examines the relation

between CEO

equity-based

compensation and M&A (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2001; Benson, Park and
Davidson, 2011).
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Definition of Variables for First Essay
Dependent
Variable
Cash
holdings
Independent
Variable
CEO to firm
debt/equity
ratio

CEO to firm
debt/equity
ratio>l
CEO inside
debt holdings
Firm size
Dividend
payout
dummy
R&D/Sales
GIM Index

NW C/Net
Assets
Cash
flow/Net
Assets

Definition and Data Source
The ratio o f cash and marketable securities to net assets
(A1/A6 -A l)
Data source: Compustat
Definition and Data Source
The natural log o f one plus the ratio o f the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio to
the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. CEO's inside is calculated as sum o f the
present value o f accumulated pension benefits and deferred
compensation; CEO equity is calculated as the value o f both stock and
option held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated as the
number o f shares multiply by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal
year, and the value o f option is calculated as the total option delta
(calculated based on Black-Scholes (1973) option formula) multiply by
the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year; firm's debt is the sum o f
current and long-term debt; firm's equity is the product o f shares
outstanding and the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year.
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Com pustat
A dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
is larger than none and zero otherwise
The sum o f the present value o f accum ulated pension benefits and
deferred compensation
Data source: Execucomp
The logarithm o f total assets
Data source: Compustat
A dummy variable that equals one if the regular cash dividends on
common stock is positive in a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f research and developm ent expense to sales
Data source: Compustat
The number o f antitakeover provisions in the firm's charter as reported
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) in 2006 and it
varies from 0 to 24.
Data source: Risk M etrics (IRRC)
The ratio o f net working capital to net assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f earnings after interest, dividends and taxes but before
depreciation divided by the book value o f net assets
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Data source: Compustat
CAPEX/Net
Assets
M arket-tobook ratio

Leverage
CEO
vega/delta
ratio

The ratio o f capital expenditures to net assets
Data source: Compustat
The book value o f net assets minus the book value o f equity plus the
market value o f equity, all divided by the book value o f net assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities
to net assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity o f the value o f CEO's accum ulated
equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the volatility o f
stock prices) to the delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the CEO's
accumulated equity-based com pensation to a one percent change in the
stock price). I adjust this CEO vega/delta ration by m ultiplying it by the
ratio o f CEO equity-holdings to CEO inside debt holdings so that this
measure captures the relative importance o f the CEO's equity holdings.
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Com pustat

Acquisition
activity
The ratio o f expenditures on acquisitions to net assets
_______________Data source: Compustat___________________________________________ _
Instruments Definition and Data Source
The age o f the CEO as reported in the Execucomp
database
CEO age
The number o f years since the first year that the firm is reported
in Compustat
Firm age
Maximum
The maximum state tax rate on individual income
state tax rate
Data source: The tax rates are obtained from
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/.
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a loss carry
forward
and zero otherwise.
Tax Status
Data source: Compustat
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm generates negative
Liquidity
operating cash flow, and zero otherwise.
Constraint
Data source: Compustat____________________________________
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Definition o f Variables for Second Essay
Independent
Variable
CEO to firm
debt/equity
ratio

CEO to firm
debt/equity
ratio> 1
CEO inside
debt holdings
Firm size

Leverage

Tobin's Q
R&D/Total
Assets
Adv./Total
Assets
CAPEX/Sales

Stock Dummy
CEO
vega/delta
ratio

Definition and Data Source
The natural log o f one plus the ratio o f the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio to
the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. CEO's inside is calculated as sum o f the
present value o f accumulated pension benefits and deferred
compensation; CEO equity is calculated as the value o f both stock and
option held by the CEO, where the value o f stock is calculated as the
number o f shares multiply by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal
year, and the value o f option is calculated as the total option delta
(calculated based on Black-Scholes (1973) option form ula ) multiply
by the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year; firm's debt is the sum
o f current and long-term debt; firm's equity is the product o f shares
outstanding and the stock price at the end o f firm's fiscal year.
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Com pustat
A dummy variable with a value o f one if CEO to firm debt/equity ratio
is larger than none and zero otherwise
The sum o f the present value o f accum ulated pension benefits and
deferred compensation
Data source: Execucomp
The logarithm o f total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f sum o f long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to
book value o f total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f market value o f the equity plus the book value o f debt to
the total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f research and developm ent expense to total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f advertising expense to total assets
Data source: Compustat
The ratio o f capital expenditures to sales
Data source: Compustat
An indicator variable with a value o f one if the acquisition is financed
entirely with stock
Data source: SDC
The ratio o f the vega (the sensitivity o f the value o f CEO's accum ulated
equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the volatility o f
stock prices) to the delta (the sensitivity o f the value o f the CEO's
accumulated equity-based compensation to a one percent change in the
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Instruments
CEO age
Firm age
Maximum
state tax rate

Tax Status
Liquidity
Constraint

stock price). I adjust this CEO vega/delta ration by m ultiplying it by the
ratio o f CEO equity-holdings to CEO inside debt holdings so that this
measure captures the relative importance o f the CEO's equity holdings
Data source: Execucomp, CRSP, Compustat_________________________
Definition and Data Source
The age o f the CEO as reported in the Execucomp database
The number o f years since the first year that the firm is reported in
Compustat
The maximum state tax rate on individual income
Data source: The tax rates are obtained from
http://www.nber.org/~taxsim /state-rates/.
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has a loss carry
forward
and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat
A dummy variable that equals to one if the firm generates negative
operating cash flow, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Compustat_______________________________________

